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Due to special characteristics of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), the 
“transaction cost” in PPPs is more than other delivery methods. Although there have 
been some attempts to study transaction costs in PPPs in Europe, transac ion costs of 
PPPs in the US has not been explored well, and the need to develop a standard cost 
breakdown structure to track, measure and estimate transaction costs in PPP projects 
is paramount. This thesis covers a theoretical discussion about the definition of 
transaction costs and different factors affecting them, and based on the mapping of 
PPP transaction activities to project costs, presents a cost breakdown structure (CBS) 
as well as a cost accounting matrix. This accounting model is just fied in chapter four 
using two case studies: I-495 HOT lanes project in Virginia, and I-595 improvements 
in Florida. Finally, in chapter 5 a template for an estimating model which can be used 
in procurement transaction cost estimates is developed based on the data collected 
from some infrastructure PPP projects in Europe, and applying Bayesian theory.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction: 
Due to limited financial resources of governments, Public Private P rtnerships (PPPs) 
have emerged as one of the most important ways of delivering infrastructure projects. 
Use of public private partnerships was widely started in some parts of the world such 
as the Netherlands, UK, Spain, Australia and South Africa. In the USA, the 
importance of private partnership was understood in the second half of the twentieth 
century. For instance, in 1960s, toll roads had been built and developed in the Spain 
by 1968. In the United Kingdom during 1980s the ruling government had turned to 
Public Private Partnerships as the preferred method for economic regeneration. (Cui, 
Sharma, Farajian, 2008) 
 
Compared to traditional delivery approaches, PPPs bundle complex investment  and 
service provisions with different project entities in a single long-term contract. 
Because of these special characteristics, and also special un ertainties associated with 
PPP agreements, many transactions and events happen during the life cycle of a PPP 
project which are not easily predictable and measurable. Therefor, the “transaction 
cost” of Public Private Partnerships is usually higher compare to other delivery 
methods such as the traditional design- bid- build approach. (Ho & Tsui, 2009) 
 
Transaction costs are known in economics as the costs associated w th executing 
projects such as searching, negotiating, contracting and enforcing. Earlier studies 
show transaction costs in other industries are significant. For instance 77% of the t tal 
incomes of the U.S. banking industry, or 13% of the total cost of Clean D velopment 
Projects are transaction costs. However, transaction costs in PPPs have not been 
explored well. There is also not enough data to conduct empirical studie  regarding 
transaction cost estimation for PPP projects. Moreover, the available data is not 




and transaction cost items. Therefore the need to develop a standard cost breakdown 
structure to estimate and track transaction cost in PPP projects is paramount.  
1.2 Importance of the Topic 
Although PPPS have been widely used in other parts of the world, they are still new 
in the United States. The experience of PPPs varies from state to s ate since it is still 
quite a new concept for transportation projects.  Based on a survey done for the 
Alabama Department of Transportation (DOT), within the total 34 responded states, 
seven states are in an identified experienced group, including California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (Figure 1). Fourstates use 
P3, while another fourteen states are planning to implement P3 in their stat s (Figure 
1). There are also eight northwest states where there is no pla to do P3 projects, 
primarily due to relatively low traffic volume. (Cui, Sharma, & Farajian, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 1: PPP Practice in the US (Cui, Sharma, & Farajian, 2008) 
As shown in Figure 1, the number of states who consider themselves experienced in 
PPPs is much less than the number of states who are currently practicing PPPs and 
consider themselves inexperienced, or states who have plans to implement it but have 
no experience yet.  As will be shown later in this thesis, even those states that 
 Experienced 
 Currently Practicing 
 Plan to Implement 
 Don’tplan to implement 




consider themselves experienced in terms of PPPs many are still struggling with 
different aspects of PPPs such as transaction costs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is believed that PPPs can bring efficiency and cost 
savings to projects.  On the other hand, since PPPs are more complex than traditional 
delivery methods, and PPP transactions are more costly, there is a need to study 
different aspects of PPP transactions in order to measure the transaction cost of PPPs. 
It is very important to measure the transaction cost of PPPs in order to compare with 
the benefits of PPPs to make sure that doing a project using PPP is financially 
feasible. Without considering the effect of transaction cost, delivering a project using 
PPP may be more costly than delivering a project using traditional delivery methods 
such as design-bid-build. 
Another issue that can be addressed here is the fact that some states such as Virginia 
have passed the legislation – The current PPP legislation status is s mmarized in 
appendix 1- to allow state DOTs to bill the transaction costs incurred by the state 
DOT while procuring a PPP project to the total cost of the project and get reimbursed 
for such costs. On the other hand, the transaction cost is one of the items which is 
eligible to be included in the cost of the project while applying for the Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loan. Therefore, there is a need for 
a systematic way to estimate it and include it in the cost estimate of the project to 
maximize the opportunity of using TIFIA in the financial pool of the project. 
1.3 State of the Field and the Need 
The majority of research and studies on transaction cost of public-private-partn rships 
have focused on the theoretical and qualitative aspects (Ho & Tsui, 2009); there have 
been only a few studies, mainly in Europe, trying to quantify transaction costs in 
PPPs. However, these studies only report the overall transaction cost (Soliño & 
Santos, 2009), or divide it into public agency transaction cost, winner bidder 




It should be noted that the PPP program in the US is very different tha  PPP program 
in other parts of the world such as European Countries. There are many reasons 
behind this difference, for instance the US legal system, legislations, lack of 
experience in terms of PPP projects, etc.  These differenc s can be seen both in terms 
of the quality and quantity of PPP literature in the research level, and also lack of 
proper guidelines and standards in the practice level. Therefore, the mentioned studi s 
are mainly based on data from projects in European countries, and the output of those 
studies may not be fully adaptive to the PPP program in the US. Therefore, there is a 
need to conduct research to estimate the transaction cost of PPP infrastructure 
projects in the US in order to include it in the total cost of the project for value for 
money (VFM) analysis and feasibility studies.  
There are many difficulties in the data collection process of this research. The first 
problem is the inconsistency in the definition of transaction cost among different state 
DOTs and even with private partners. There is also an inconsistency in different 
terminologies used for transaction costs. Some people call it procurement cost, some 
call transaction cost and some others call contract cost. This inconsistency in 
definition results in inconsistency in data, and makes the analysis of the data almost 
impossible. In addition, there are many limitations in terms of measuring transaction 
costs due to limitations of the current accounting systems that state DOTs are using.  
Another difficulty in this field is the way that transaction cost is recorded in different 
projects in different states. Unfortunately, there is no standard guiline or cost 
accounting system that can address transaction cost issues for PPP projects in the US. 
Current accounting systems do not allocate the time that each staff works on different 
projects based on projects. Therefore there is no cost breakdown structure for 
transaction cost of PPP projects in the US. 
Besides the difficulties of measurement and definition that are unique to transaction 
costs, empirical transaction cost analysis is also subject to the problems found in 
empirical work more generally. Usually, it is very difficult to find data about 




are not consistent. This issue will be discussed later in chapter 4 while comparing two 
case studies about the I-495 HOT lanes project in Virginia, and the I-595 
improvements project in Florida.  The results of these two case studies further support 
the hypothesis that there is a need for a better accounting system to identify and track 
transaction cost items to better analyze transaction costs in PPP infrastructure projects 
in the US.   
1.4 Research Methodology: 
This thesis sets the needs for research based on a literature review which studies the 
PPP as a new, innovative approach to financing infrastructure projcts, and applies 
the concepts of transaction cost economics (TCE) in PPPs. In order t  o so, the 
application of TCE in other industries is reviewed, which will be followed by a 
literature review of the transaction cost in PPPs in other parts of the world particularly 
in the United States. A general PPP process flowchart is driven based on the PPP 
practice in different states. This flowchart will be the basis of future developments in 
this research. 
 
A cost breakdown structure is developed for different activities in a PPP transaction. 
Different activities in the PPP process flowchart are mapped with different cost items, 
and based on this mapping a cost accounting matrix is developed. The cost c nters in 
the cost accounting matrix are defined in a way that they can restore as much useful 
information as possible. For instance the project ID contains the information about 
the state, the county, and project type and project number. The accounting number 
also contains information about the party incurred the cost, phase, activity ID, 
external /internal, direct/indirect. This information will enable th accounting system 
to have a better cost breakdown structure, and gives the managers and cost estimators 
to retrieve reports with useful data in a more consistent way.  
 
Later in the study, to validate the discussion in the previous section, two case studies 
are conducted about the current practice of transaction cost in PPP infrastructure 




information about projects, phone interviews with project managers or financial 
managers / advisors. The collected data is analyzed and compared with the results of 
similar studies in Europe, and finally the two case studies are compared with each 
other and the expected results from the model developed in previous stage of he case 
study. 
 
Finally a cost estimation template is developed in this thesis. Th  model is developed 
based on Bayesian theorem by developing a Bayesian network. The inputs of the 
model are the main 4 attributes affecting transaction costs as suggested by literature. 
The relationships in the model are defined based on the current PPP practice and 
guidelines in the US. Because of lack of data regarding transaction ost of PPP 
infrastructure in the US, the conditional relationships (probabilities) are defined based 
on a study done in Europe. The outcome of this template model is an estimation of 
transaction cost for different entities enrolled in a PPP project.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline: 
This thesis is organized in six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introductin which establishes 
the research need and explains the methodology and structure of the thesis. C apter 2 
is a literature review which studies the PPP as a new, innovative pproach to 
financing infrastructure projects, and applies the concepts of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) in PPPs. In order to do so, the application of TCE in other 
industries is reviewed, which will be followed by a literature review of the transaction 
cost in PPPs in other parts of the world.  
 
In Chapter 3, based on the mapping of transaction activities to project c sts, the study 
presents a cost breakdown structure (CBS) for PPP transactions. The hierarchical 
structure that is developed in this innovative approach to PPP projects covers costs 
incurred by the public partner associated with PPP transaction activities, such as 
information searching, preliminary studies, bidding, negotiation, consulti g, 




CBS’  has been developed: one level covers five different stages of PPPs, another 
level covers cost accounts based on labor, equipment and material, and 
subcontracting classification. The last level contains the cost centers.  
 
In chapter 4, the  tracking model is justified using two case studies: I-595 
improvements in Florida as a good practice of tracking transaction osts in a PPP 
infrastructure project, and the I-495 HOT lanes project in Virgin a as a bad example 
of tracking and recording transaction costs in a PPP infrastructure project. 
 
The last chapter presents a template for an estimating model which can be used in 
procurement transaction cost estimates. This template has been developed based on 
the data collected from some infrastructure PPP projects in Europe, and has been 
designed using Bayesian theory in order to account for the number of bidders 
(bidding competition level), capital cost of the project, location (PPP program 









Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last few years, many countries have witnessed an increased provision of 
public goods by private-for-profit firms and not-for-profit-firms. Their involvement in 
PPP arrangements can vary from designing schools, hospitals, ro ds, or sanitation 
facilities, to structuring their financing to include construc ion, operation, 
maintenance, management, and ownership. The World Bank estimates that the private 
sector financed about 20 percent of infrastructure investments—amounting to about 
US$ 850 billion—in developing countries during the 1990s.  Several industrial 
countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, UK, and Spain) have adopted PPP arrangements to 
provide education, health, water, and waste management facilities as well as other 
infrastructure development. 
 
This section of this thesis will review the literature, and gives a general understanding 
of PPPs, their benefits, and financial mechanism. Before making any comments about 
PPPs, one should have a good understanding of different aspects of PPPs in order to 
be able to analyze the performance of PPPs. Reviewing what other sc olars have 
found about PPP delivery method will help us to better develop our model bas d on 
their findings. Particularly, the focus of the literature review on PPPs in this thesis is 
on PPP process flowchart, PPP characteristics and performance measurement. 
 
Like any other new technique, there are some befits and some costs associated with a 
PPP transaction.  It is very important to know about the extra coststha  a PPP 
transaction has because in the cost estimation and value for money (VFM) analysis of 
a PPP project one needs to account for such costs. Therefore, there is a n ed to study 
the transaction cost economics, and the way that people have measured such costs in 
other industries in order to have a better understanding of how those conc pts can be 







Studying the effect of TCE in PPPs is essential to track the special characteristics 
associated with them. PPPs have a high uncertainty, bounded rationality, and 
opportunism behavior as a result of the lengthy life cycle of the project, complex 
contracting mechanisms, a complex pool of finances, and multiple entities with 
different interests in a project.  The effect of asset specificity due to the special 
characteristics of highway projects in comparison to other construction projects 
should also be noted. Thus, it can be concluded that PPPs are highly exposed to 
transaction cost factors that need to be carefully studied, determined, and tracked with 
TCE.  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the literature on PPPs. It 
covers definitions of PPPs as well as characteristics of PPPs and performance 
measurement of PPP projects. Section 2 talks about the importance of TCE and 
presents a brief overview of the history of the theory development followed by 
different attempts to define transaction cost over time. Section 2 also covers some 
theoretical and methodological issues related to TCE, and defines some terminologies 
which are being used in this theory. It summarizes the relevant empirical research 
which is being done in capital project financing using the TCE appro ch; and finally 
covers the public private partnership implications of TCE, and analyzes diff rent 
attempts to estimate transaction costs in PPPs in other parts of the world.  
2.2 Public Private Partnerships 
2.2.1 Definition 
The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships defines a public-private 
partnership as “a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on 
the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards.” Other working definitions are 
better prescribed and speak to the characteristics and changes that must occur within a 




Century: A Partnership Model, public-private partnerships are further defined as: 
“Relationships among government agencies and private or nonprofit contractrs that 
should be formed when dealing with services or products of highest complexity. In 
comparison to traditional design-bid-built, they require radical changes in the roles 
played by all partners”  (NASCIO, 2006). While PPPs have been exercised in many 
countries over the years, there are still disagreements in how a PPP should be defined.  
The Office of Public Sector Information in the United Kingdom defines PPPs as 
“arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private sector.”  
 
PPPs are widespread across a variety of business entities, and, furthermore, the HM 
Treasury, 2008, states that, “In their broadest sense (PPPs), they can cover all typ s of 
collaborations across the public-private sector interface involving collaboratively 
working together and risk-sharing to deliver policies, services and infrastructure.” In 
Australia, a PPP is defined as “a long-term contract between the public and private 
sectors where government pays the private sector to deliver infrastructure and related 
services on behalf, or in support, of government’s broader service responsibilities. 
PPPs typically make the private sector parties who build infrastructure responsible for 
its condition and performance on a whole-of-life basis” (Australian Government: 
Infrastructure Australia, 2008). The U.S. DOT’s Report to Congress on Public-Private 
Partnerships (U.S.DOT 2004) defines a PPP as “a contractual agreement formed 
between public and private sector partners, which allows more private-sector 
participation than is traditional”. This agreement is usually signed between a 
government agency contracting with a private company to renovate, design, build, 
operate, maintain a facility or system for a long period of time.  
 
Although PPPs have been in practice for many years in the world, in the US, PPPs 
have just begun to replace the public provision of infrastructure service in recent 
years. The surge in PPPs is reflected in the financial press. For example, articles in 
the Financial Times mentioning this concept increased twenty-fold over the last 
decade, from 50 in 1995 to 1,153 in 2005 In Britain about 14% of public investment 




Projects that require large up-front investments, such as highways, water and 
sewerage, bridges, seaports and airports, hospitals, jails and schools are often 
provided via PPPs.   
 
PPP’s have also proven to cut down costs and the time it takes to deliver projects As 
shown in Table 1 below, findings of the UK’s National Audit Office recorded that the 
cost overruns for the public sector using PPP procurement is only 22% compared to 
73% in the case of conventional procurement. Furthermore, the delay in project 
delivery using PPP procurement is only 24% compare to 70% in conventional 









Cost Overruns for 
the Public Sector  
73% 22% 
Delay in Project 
Delivery  
70% 24% 
Source: UK's National Audit Office 
 
On the other hand, some consider PPPs as a way for privatization, and argue that 
public services should be done by non-profit public agencies that are not unning for 
profit. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) reject this notion because with pr vatization, the 
government no longer has a direct role in ongoing operations, whereas, with a PPP, 
the government retains the power to control the quality of the project as well as toll 
fees. This power is usually addressed in different provisions of PPP agreements.  
 
Although PPPs can help governments fill the gap between available pu lic funds and 
needed resources, they may increase the cost of procuring, monitoring and enforcing 
contracts especially when compared to traditional procurement of public investment 




character, ownership and financing structures, and risk-sharing features (Gerti & 
Timo, 2005). Due to these reasons, and that  the degree of contractual complexity in 
PPPs is high, more attempts to reach agreements results in increased  costs associated 
with a PPP transaction. Consequently, the search (tendering and bidding), contracting, 
and monitoring processes become more resource-consuming—both in terms of 
budget and time—than in traditional methods of procuring projects. Negotiating the 
contract is especially costly mainly because the level of uncertainty in PPPs is high 
and risk and rewards remain unclear. Although there is a considerable amount of 
transaction costs associated with PPPs, there is still not enough information about 
how to define, track, and quantify this cost. In evaluating PPP proposals, it is very 
important to be able to estimate the transaction costs of the contra t to ensure that the 
higher transaction costs do not erode the cost savings achieved through a PPP 
structure. 
 
The case of PPPs in the transportation sector is particularly compelling. Congestion 
costs in the top US metro areas have grown steadily, reaching $63.1 billion in 2003, 
60% higher (in real terms) than a decade earlier (Schrank and Lomax, 2005). This 
fact, combined with budgetary problems and technological improvements in toll 
collection, has led more than 20 U.S. states to pass legislation allowing the operation 
of public-private partnerships to build, finance and operate toll-roads, bridges and 
tunnels (“Paying on the Highway to Get out of First Gear.” New York Times, April 
28, 2005). Recent examples of PPP contracts in the U.S. transport sector include the 
Dulles Greenway, the I-495 HOT lanes, the I-595 improvements, the Port of Miami 
Tunnel, the Southbay Expressway, the Chicago Skyway, the Indiana Toll Road and 
the Pocahontas Parkway. 
 
As stated before, there are several definitions for “Public-Private Partnership”, 
however, in this paper, PPP is meant to be a design-build-operate-fin nce delivery 
(DBOF) of infrastructure project such that (i) assets are controlled by a private firm 
for a (possibly infinite) term; (ii) during the duration of the contrac , the firm is the 




concession. However, these claims are ambiguous due to contract incompleteness; 
and (iii) there is a considerable amount of public planning in the design of the project 
(Engle et al., 2008). 
2.2.2 Characteristics of PPPs 
The main characteristic of a PPP, when compared with the traditional approach to the 
provision of infrastructure, is that it bundles investment and service provisions in a 
single long term contract. For the duration of the contract, which can be as long as 
twenty or thirty years, the concessionaire will manage and control the assets, usually 
in exchange for user fees, which are its compensation for the investment and other 
costs. At the end of the concessionare, the project reverts to government ownership. 
(Engle et al., 2008) 
 
As the economics of PPPs are still incorrectly perceived, practice has run ahead of 
theory. Some practitioners and governments claim that PPPs relieve strained budgets 
and release public funds, while others suggest that PPPs are appealing because 
finance, investment and management is delegated to private firms, which are more 
efficient than government. Despite these seemingly reasonable arguments, the 
experience with PPPs has resulted in an array of outcomes. Whereas in some cases, 
previous expectations are met, in many more cases, contracts are renegotiated in favor 
of the concessionaire, or, conversely, are subject to regulatory takings. Often 
deadlines are not met, or the project requires substantial subsidies to be finished 
(Guasch, 2004). The reasoning behind this shortcoming seems to be that the 
profitability of PPP projects is subject to large exogenous demand uncertainty, which 
is often not considered properly when designing the contracts. This explains why 
renegotiations take place when demand is lower than expected, as well  the array of 
risk sharing agreements that are observed. 
 
Since PPP projects tend to be based on contracts that extend over a lng period of 
time, e.g. 25 years or more, and also are associated with high uncertai ty and risk, the 




contract, unforeseeable events will occur (e.g. technical advances) and many of these 
events will be unverifiable (e.g., a contractor’s effort to improve safety cannot be 
easily verified). Road projects, for example, can involve a fair amount of uncertainty 
about the final good that will be produced. This problem is aggravated due to th  
opportunism of the individual parties to the contract. Therefore, in the presence of 
bounded rationality and opportunism, one could expect that undertaking a project 
through a hierarchical structure will result, in principle, in lower transaction costs, 
(and therefore, fewer incomplete contracts) because the parties to he transactions will 
behave more cooperatively than under market conditions. Thus, when a hybrid mode 
of governance such as PPP is utilized, government will need to limit the scope to 
reduce  opportunistic behavior (Soliño, 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Success factors in PPPs 
In order to better understand the key success factors in PPPs, one should understand 
the definition of a success factor first. In a study (Hardcastle et.al) published by Hong 
Kong University, the critical success factors in PPPs are defined and discussed.  
(Hardcastle, Edwards, Akintoye, & Li). Based on this study, Rockart (1982) defines 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) as: "those few key areas of activity in which 
favorable results are absolutely necessary for a manager to reach his/her goals." It 
should be mentioned that the  CSF  methodology  is  a  procedure  that  attempts  to  
identify  key  areas  that  dictate managerial success. This method is widely used as a 
management measure in financial services, information systems and the 
manufacturing industry.   
 
There have also been attempts to apply it in construction management (Sanvido et al., 
1992; Yeo, 1991). Hardcastel et.al (2010) studied other factors such as good 
governance, government support, a stable macroeconomic environment, and a 
suitable legal and administrative framework. They concluded that sound economic 
policy, including the available financing market, a strong and good private 
consortium, good feasibility  study/cost-benefit  analysis, and effective risk 




support,  commitment of different entities, and mutual benefit are all critical  factors  
for  the  success  of  PPP  procurement  projects. A quick look at the above key 
success factors reveals that most of them are related to activities of a PPP transaction 
such as feasibility studies, negotiations, and risk and reward sharing mechanisms 
during procurement, or partnership mutuality and enforcement after procurement.  So, 
the way that a PPP transaction is managed plays a great role in the overall success or 
failure of the project. It should be emphasized that a PPP transaction, like any other 
transaction, is associated with some transaction activities, and some transaction costs 
which will be further discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
2.3 Transaction Cost in Public Private Partnerships 
2.3.1 Overview on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
A fundamental assumption in economics, known as the Law of One Price, is that in a 
competitive market, all buyers face the same price. Neoclassi al Economic Theory is 
based on the assumption of an “ideal world” in which the price mechanism exi ts and 
the trading value is determined based solely on the supply and demand factors.  In 
this “ideal world”, the supplier and the buyer meet in a free market and reach an 
agreement without any negotiations because the price is already d termined by the 
free market. In this “ideal world,” the exchange cost is just the cost of the item itself.  
The decision to make the trade or not is based on how much an individual or 
organization should spend to produce the same good or service in house.  If the good 
can be produced at price lower than market price, it is better to produce it in house; 
otherwise it will be purchased from the market. However, in the “real world,” the 
exchange of goods and services is not that simple.  
In the “real economy,” if the appropriate price is measured, buyers often face 
different prices for the same good, even in a competitive market. These price 
variations are likely to affect what is produced and what exchanges take place in the 
market, which organizations and specialties survive, and even which rules of the 




vertical boundary decisions are determined by technological factors (i.e.: economies 
of scale or scope) while the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) distinguishes these 
decisions to have the possibility of being influenced by characteristics associated with 
the efficiency of the chosen form of organization. Simply put, the TCT explains what 
Neoclassical Economics failed to consider: bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset 
specificity and opportunism behavior in the “real world”. 
 In contrast to the suggestion in Neoclassical Economics that a firms’ vertical 
boundary decisions are determined by technological factors such as economies of 
scale or scope, the TCT believes that these decisions may also be influenced by 
characteristics associated with the efficiency of the chosen form of organization.  In 
other words, TCT explains what classic economics ignored: bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, asset specificity and opportunism behavior in the “real world”.  
Transaction Cost Theories of Exchange, part of what has been termed the "New 
Institutional Economics," have been the subject of growing interest in recent years. 
Originally, an explanation for the scale and scope of the firm, Transaction Cost 
Theories (TCE) is now used to study a variety of economic phenomena. These range 
from vertical and lateral integration to transfer pricing, corporate finance, marketing, 
the organization of work, long-term commercial contracting, franchising, regulation, 
the multinational corporation, company towns, and other contractual relationships, 
both formal and informal. The basic belief surrounding TCE is that transactions must 
be governed as well as designed and carried out, and that certain institutional 
arrangements affect this governance better than others is now increasingly accepted 
(Shelanski & Klein, 1995). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad picture 
of transaction costs: their history, definition, foundation, use, measurement and 
implications. Next, these concepts are studied in the context of PPPs.  
British economist Ronald Coase began writing papers discussing the economy in the 
early 1930s questioning businessmen about the business methodologies they used. 
One key question involved why firms chose to produce some of their own inputs 




independent suppliers) (Hazlett, 1997). In 1937, Coase published his article, "The 
Nature of the Firm," explaining the basic economics of a business enterprise. It 
became one of the most influential works in the history of dismal science, outlining 
the subtle logic of how firms pursue efficiency in a complicated world. The article 
provided a sophisticated approach when compared to works in 1930s American 
vogue that wrote toward the belief that a corporation was simply an accident waiting 
to self-destruct. However, failing to provide an operational framework, Coase’s 
article was neglected for a long time (Klaes, 2000). 
The ‘neoclassical’ literature on transaction costs starts with Coase (1937), and was 
further developed in the 1950s. This literature defines transaction costs more 
narrowly, generally models them more explicitly and often analytic lly identical to 
transportation charges or taxes (Allen, 1999).  In 1960, Coase rearranged the study of 
economics with his essay "The Problem of Social Cost." It analyzed what happens 
when economic actions affect third parties.  
Although transaction cost theory was first introduced about 80 years ago, and many 
scholars have done extensive amounts of research in this field since then, there are 
few direct empirical estimates of transaction costs. One problem is that there is no 
standard terminology (Benham & Benhal, 2001). Many different definitions of 
transaction costs appear in literature. They often serve as heuristic devices that are not 
used actually to measure transaction costs. Although these definitions offer powerful 
conceptual insight, they have not been translated into widely accepted o erational 
standards. 
There are two major branches of literature that have tried to define transaction costs 
in an economical context. The first branch is the Coasian approach whifocuses on 
the quantification of transaction costs and the impact on volume of trade. The second 
branch is  the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach propagated by 
Williamson which emphasizes the design of institutions and contracts to minimize 
unobservable transaction costs that are not directly quantified  (Antinori & Sathaye, 




but require adaptation for defining and quantifying transaction costs in public private 
partnership infrastructure projects. 
2.3.2 Transaction Cost definition 
Coase (1937) defines the term transaction costs as “costs using price mechanisms 
associated with specifying, negotiating, and enforcing contracts.”  He argues that if 
transacting in the market is proved to be too costly, transactions will take place within 
the boundaries of the firm.  Coase provides examples of what he meant by the costs 
of the price mechanism: discovering what the prices are and negotiating and closing a 
contract. Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as “the costs of running the 
economic system”.  In the years to follow, Wallis and North (1986) drew a distinction 
between transformation activities and transaction activities. They define transaction 
costs as the cost of resources which are consumed for a transactio  function rather 
than a transformation function. They define transaction costs as the costs of 
processing and conveying information, coordinating, purchasing, marketing, 
advertising, selling, handling legal matters, shipping, and managing and supervising. 
Niehans (1969) defines transaction costs as follows: “The term “transactions costs” or 
“transfer costs” shall be used for the costs associated with the transfer of ownership 
from one individual to another. They are a catchall term for a rathe  heterogeneous 
assortment of costs. The parties have to communicate; information will be exchanged; 
contracts are drawn up; the goods must be inspected, weighed and measured; nd 
accounts have to be kept. To a certain extent, transactions involve additional 
transportation in space over and above what is required to move goods frm producer 
to consumer “(Niehans 1969). Two points are noteworthy in this passage. On the one 
hand, transaction costs are defined in a very broad way. On the other hand, no 
distinction is made between transaction costs and transport costs (Klae , 2000). From 
the perspective of economic modeling, this strategy facilitated th  accommodation of 
the new cost category within the existing analytical framework. 
Toward the mid-1970s, Williamson increasingly emphasized the notion of the 
transaction in his analysis of governance structures, simultaneously starting to refer to 




costs of writing and executing complex contracts across a market vary with the 
characteristics of the human decision makers who are involved with the transaction 
on the one hand, and the objective properties of the market on the other …” 
(Williamson, 1974).  In 1985, Williamson defined transaction costs to include the 
costs of drafting, negotiating and enforcing an agreement, and also the costs of 
governance and bonding costs to secure commitments (Williamson, 1985).  This is 
the result of Williamson’s strategy to operationalize transaction costs, not by 
elaborating on the concept itself, but by replacing it with a detailed analysis of 
contractual and organization arrangements (Klaes, 2000). 
Unlike the previous approaches where transaction costs have an exact value, 
Williamson’s approach provides the notion that transaction costs have rel tive values 
and can be different from one market to another or from one organizatio  to another. 
Williamson’s analysis takes place as an exploration of the causes which give rise to 
transaction costs (Klaes, 2000). In the same manner, Davis (1986) defines tra saction 
costs as those costs associated with "greasing markets," including the costs of 
obtaining information, monitoring behavior, compensating intermediaries, and 
enforcing contracts.  From another point of view, North (1990) explains the 
transaction costs as “the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements.” 
Alchian and Woodward (1988) distinguish between two types of transactions: 
exchange transactions involving the transfer of property rights and contra ti g 
transactions involving negotiating and enforcing promises about performance.  
By comparing all definitions, the transaction cost in this report is assumed to be the 
sum of the costs associated with searching for a contract, finding a partner, and 
engaging in exchange and contracting activities, which are separat d from the direct 




2.3.3 Transaction Cost Economics Theorem and Terminology 
After defining transaction costs, it is important to discuss how to measure transaction 
costs. However, before assessing transaction costs, one should be familiar with the 
concepts of TCE and the different terminologies used in this theorem. This section 
covers these terminologies and discusses how they are related to transac ion costs in 
the TCE context. Some of the most important terminology discussed in this section 
are as follows: idiosyncratic transactions, asset specificity, bounded rationality, 
frequency of trades, complexity and uncertainty. 
• Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the investm n s made to support a 
particular transaction have a higher value to that transaction than they would have if 
they were redeployed for any other purpose (McGuinness, 1994). Williamson (1975, 
1985, 1986) argues that transaction-specific assets are not redeployable and that 
physical and human investments are specialized and unique to a task. In other words, 
asset specificity is referred to as the degree to which a party is tied to a transaction or 
investment. For example, asset specificity is high in PPP infrastructure projects due to 
the characteristics of these projects. If a private company invests in a PPP 
infrastructure project, it will not be able to effortlessly change its business plans and 
stop work on the project without losing the investments. In typical real estate 
contracts, the land and the building structures have value even though the project is 
not completed and it is always possible to sell them any timebefore project 
completion. In a PPP infrastructure project, however, it is nearly impossible to sell an 
incomplete road.  
• Opportunism 
Opportunism has been defined by Williamson as self-interest seeking with guile. In 
other words, it recognizes that businesses and individuals will sometimes seek to 
exploit a situation to their own advantage (Williamson, 1979). This doesn t imply 
that those persons involved in transactions act opportunistically all of the time, rather, 




there exists a small number bargaining problem (Williamson, 1979). For example, the 
fewer the number of alternative suppliers available to a buyer, th  more likely it is 
that an existing supplier will act opportunistically to alter the terms of the business 
relationship to their own advantage. They can accomplish this by demanding a higher 
price than previously agreed upon. Due to conflicts in the interests of different entities 
in PPPs, this phenomena is often imperative in PPPs. One method to reuce 
opportunistic behavior of different parties is to implement a fair risk and reward 
negotiation in order to increase the interdependence magnitude of the contract. This 
methodology will be further discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
• Uncertainty 
Due to the characteristics of the real market, uncertainty about future events is clearly 
a common feature of many trading relationships. Sales volume uncertai ty due to 
volatile market conditions is an obvious example. Empirical studies sometimes treat 
this kind of uncertainty as an independent variable, regressing the choice of 
organizational form on the variance of sales or another variable without including any 
measure of asset specificity in the model. However, in absent fix d investments, TCE 
does not predict that uncertainty itself would lead to hierarchical governance. 
When there are no relationship-specific investments at stake, it may be less costly for 
a firm to contract in the market for goods and services in an uncertain nvironment 
than to assume the risk of producing them internally. This way, the effect of 
uncertainty depends on competitive conditions. If there is no asset specificity and 
there are many potential suppliers of a component for which future demand is 
uncertain, it may be cheaper to buy the component than to make it internally. 
The specific responses that exchange parties manifest depend on whether the 
environment is certain or uncertain. Environments that are characterized by relatively 
few or a rare occurrence of problems tend to develop a fixed set of routines for 




the same environment concerns regularly and conventions for handling the minor or 
rare interruptions tend to be respected industry-wide. 
Ryu (2006) uses an analysis from the responses of 137 purchasing managers i  
manufacturing firms that supported the proposition that changes in the level of 
uncertainty due to external circumstances increase the extent to which the 
manufacturers monitor the suppliers when the interdependence magnitude is low. He 
claims that environmental uncertainty has no effect on monitoring when 
interdependence magnitude is high. These results provide an important addition to 
transaction cost theory; the inclusion of inter-organizational interdependence in 
transaction cost theory increases the understanding of inter-organizational 
governance.  
 
Figure 2: The Four Groups Characterized by Two Levels of Internal and External Environments (Source: 
Ryu, 2006) 
Cells 1 & 3 reflect an instance in accordance with the bilateral deterrence theory, that 
depicts when interdependence magnitude is high, exchange parties are each 
vulnerable to retaliation from the other. Thus, an attempt to control exchange partners 
through overt governance (monitoring) produces a greater likelihood of retaliation. 
Cell 2 represents highly uncertain environments which lead to the developm nt of the 
condition in which the information about the environment is asymmetrically 
distributed between exchange parties.Cell 4 represents a low interdependence 
environment which allows parties to behave opportunistically due to low retaliation 







Figure 3: A Model for the Influence of Internal and External Environments on Monitoring (Ryu, 2006) 
2.3.4 Measuring Transaction Costs 
The empirical work in TCE uses a variety of econometric and historical methods. In 
general, these studies fall into one of the following three categories: qualitative case 
studies, quantitative case studies, and cross-sectional econometric analyses. 
Williamson's (1976) study of cable TV franchising in Oakland, Californ a is an 
example of the first category, while Masten's (1984) investigation of contracting 
practices in a large aerospace corporation is an example of the second. Levy's (1985) 
study of vertical integration across industries is an example of the third category. 
Most of the empirical literature in TCE consists of various kinds of case analyses. 
This is primarily because quantifying the main variables of interes  to transaction cost 
economists – such as asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency - are difficult to 
measure consistently across firms and industries. Typically, these characteristics are 
estimated based on surveys or interviews. For example, a manager might be asked to 
rate on a Likert-type scale of 1 to 7 the degree to which an investment has value in 
outside uses. Such data are definitely subject to the general limits of survey data, for 
example, that they are based on the respondents' stated beliefs, rather th n on their 
beliefs or valuations as revealed through choice. More importantly, since these 
measurements are based on ordinal rankings, it is hard to compare them from industry 
to industry. What is ranked as a relatively specialized asset in one firm may be rated 




comparatively uncertain production process may be the standard operating 
environment in another firm. Therefore, Multi-industry studies may contain variables 
that are labeled the same thing but are really incommensurable or, conversely, may 
contain variables that are identical but labeled differently. 
 Besides these measurement difficulties, empirical research in TCE is often hampered 
by confusion about definitions, which also leads to questioning the empirical 
parameterizations of key variables. The primary conceptual problem that we have 
found lies in the treatment of uncertainty as a factor that raises transaction costs and 
increases the probability of integration. This confusion may explain some seemingly 
contradictory results on the effects of sales volume uncertainty o  the vertical 
integration decision. 
At the level of the whole economy, Wallis and North (1986) have calculated that 
transaction costs (or rather the transactions sector of the economy) represented fully 
40-8% of the GNP of America in 1970. Their division of costs into transaction osts 
and transformation costs is, unfortunately, unlikely to be translatable into business 
decision-making. In a perceptive comment on the Wallis and North article, Davis 
adds a comment highly relevant to our current endeavor, quoting Charles Plott as 
saying 'transaction costs are a useful notion whose usefulness declines 
proportionately with the preciseness of the definition' (cited by Davis, 1986, p. 149). 
Figure 4 below shows how different people have tried to measure transaction costs in 
different industries. Colby (1990) uses the classical definition of transaction costs 
and categorizes them into four main items: searching cost, preliminary studies cost, 
negotiation costs and approval costs. Noi (2002) attempts to estimate the Aid 
Transaction Costs in Vietnam and categorizes transaction costs into three main 
categories: project identification and appraisal, negotiations and contra ti g, and 
finally project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  In Antinori and Sathaye’s 
(2007) study regarding assessing transaction costs of project-based greenhouse gas 
emissions trading, they develop the model based on search cost, feasibility studies 




The United Nations Development Programm
costs in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects are some examples of 
attempts that have been done to assess transaction costs in different industries
categorizing them into design costs, other CDM costs including registration, other 





Figure 3: Categorizing transaction cost in transaction costmeasurement attempts
 
2.4 Measuring transactions costs in PPPs
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
There are several reasons why transaction costs in PPPs 
compared to traditional procurement
are mainly because of the characteristics of PPPs such as their 
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reasons, the degree of contractual incompleteness in PPPs is high. Transaction costs 
in PPPs are also high because there is a need for an extensive attempt to deal with 
uncertainties and reduce the contractual incompleteness as well as contract 
enforcement and conflict resolution. Therefore,  the search (tendering and bidding), 
contracting, and monitoring processes become more resource-consuming than in 
traditional short-term contracting aimed to supply assets, rather than services, to the 
public sector. Negotiation of the contract is also costly. Also, due to  high uncertainty 
and complexity of PPPs, there is a need for consulting and advisory services. Such 
costs are not limited to the pre-delivery phase, as renegotiation s almost inevitable in 
contracts that stretch over decades. Also, a PPP is established for service provisions 
using privately owned assets while different entities with conflicts in their interest 
might entail higher monitoring costs than in-house provision of the same service.  
 
2.4.2 Theoretical works 
There have also been some attempts to estimate transaction costs in PPP projects.  Ho 
and Tsui (2009) tried to identify some major variables such as principal-principal and 
renegotiation problems as well as soft budget constraints and their eff cts on 
transaction costs in PPPs. They suggest that some transaction cos sensitive variables 
such as specific characteristics of the project itself and certain conditions 
characterizing institutional environments can have a significant effect on transaction 
costs. Although they explain the effect of some variables on transaction costs in a 
PPP model, their study does not reflect the situation in the US. For instance, due to 
the public procurement procedure,  transparency rules, and regulations in the United 
States, it is almost impossible to face principal-principal problems in which “the 
controlling principal who appoints the major directors of its board and top managers 
of the firm might exploit private information and dominant positions to appropriate 
from minority shareholders” (Ho & Tsui, 2009).  
 
2.4.3 Empirical works 
In another study, Soliño & Santos (2009) try to distinguish, at every stage, between 




as project preparation costs. These costs considered include the Environmental 
Impact Assessment, feasibility study, preliminary design, and bidding costs including 
tender documentation preparation and costs for negotiation. Their study is based on 
data collected from different infrastructure projects in the European Union (EU) that 
suggests a model to estimate the transaction cost of PPPs based on ome variables 
(i.e.: type of project, capital cost of project, procurement duration, location, and 
number of bidders). Their study cannot be fully be implemented as an estimating 
model in the United States mainly because their data is based on projects in the EU. 
In addition to this issue, the PPP model in the EU is better developed and more 
mature than the PPP model in the United States. Therefore, ther is a higher amount 
uncertainity associated with the PPP model in the United States that may result in 
higher transaction costs when compared to the EU model. It should also be noted that 
Soliño & Santos  (2009) categorize transaction costs only into two main categories: 
external and internal. Their research does not consider a cost breakdown structure 
with different levels of cost items to better track and record transaction costs in PPP 
agreements. 
 
Another step to identify and measure transaction costs has been taken by Gerti 
Dudkin and Timo Välilä (Dudkin & Välilä, 2005).  According to the data collected 
from projects financed by the European Investment Bank, they have concluded that 
the level of transaction costs in the procurement phase of infrastructure projects are, 
on average, about 10 percent of the capital value of the project. They hav  divided 
these transaction costs into three categories consisting of public sector, winning 
bidders, and losing bidders as depicted in Figure 4 below. Based on their resea ch,  
the overall  transaction cost of the project for the public sector, is about 2-3% of the 







Figure 4: Transaction cost in PPP projects in EU countries (Dudkin & Välilä, 2005) 
 
 
To summarize, transaction costs to the public sector and the winning bidder vary 
between countries (legal systems) and sectors, and they are significantly higher in 
small projects (below £25 million) and in projects that have a long procurement time 
(over 50 months). In contrast, neither experience in setting up partnerships nor the 
number of bidders affect the costs to the public sector and the winning bidder. This is 
in contrast with findings of Santos (2009) and Tsui (2009). 
 
2.4.4 Important Factors Affecting Transaction Costs of PPPs 
 
There are many factors that can affect the percentage of transaction costs in PPPs. For 
instance, size of the project, number of bidders, complexity of the proj ct, market 
value of the project, and location of the project.. 
• Size of the Project 
 
One of the most important factors in estimating transaction costs of PPP infrastructure 
projects is the size of the project. Usually, a transaction cost is reported as a 
percentage of the total capital cost of the project, however, when the size of project 




higher than larger projects in terms of the percentage of the total capital cost of the 
project. This occurs because no matter what the size of the project, many of the 
transaction activities stay the same. However, since the complexity of larger projects 
is usually higher than smaller projects, transaction activities may cost more; but this 
increase in cost is not proportional to the increase in capital cost of the project. Figure 
5 depicts projects costs with respect to transaction costs during the procurement phase 
of a project. 
 




• Number of bidders 
 
The next factor which plays a role in percentage of transaction ost is the 
number of bidders. In the event of a lesser amount of competition, transaction costs 
during the project initiation and procurement phases will be relativ y low, but it is 
likely that total project costs will be higher due to a weaker competitive procurement 
process. One would expect the public-sector cost of bidding to increase with the 














































screening, and proposal evaluations, and also due to the increase in the transaction 
cost of losing bidders. On the other hand, transaction costs in the project initiation and 
procurement phases will be relatively lower, but it is likely that e total project cost 
will be higher due to less competitive procurement process.   Figure 6 below outlines 
the transaction costs as a percentage of capital cost with respect to the number of 








• PPP program maturity (Location) 
 
Another factor that affects transaction costs in PPPs is the location of the project. The 
meaning of location in this context is not the actually geographic location of the 
project, but the country or state in which the project will be constructed. In another 
perspective, the location can be defined as the maturity level of the PPP program in 















































defined as having enough legal supports for PPPs, having enough resources f r PPPs 
both in terms of manpower and knowledge, and also having enough previous 
experience with other projects using PPP as the delivery method. Some countries like 
the United Kingdom (UK) have a tremendous amount of experience and resources for 
PPPs. Some other countries are new in this field and the PPP program in those 
countries is not as mature as the PPP program in UK. Because of th experience 
effect, they incur more transaction costs. There are many factors that determine 
whether the country is advanced in terms of PPPs or if the PPP program in that 
country is still under development. Having a good legislator base, having enough 
experience in terms of previous PPP contracts, having enough resources in-house in 
terms of experienced staff and consultants and having good partners who have 
already worked with them on other projects can all be determinant factors in thi case. 
For instance, the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) has already 
contracted for some PPP projects such as SH-130, and has invested on gathering 
enough resources for their PPP projects, while having a good legislative base for their 
program. The transaction cost that a PPP project in Texas will incur should be less 
than then transaction cost of a PPP project in Georgia in which Georgia Department 




Another issue that can increase the transaction cost in PPP projects is the level of 
complexity of the project. Complexity increases uncertainty or risk and, will increase 
the likelihood of having higher transaction costs. The specific responses that different 
parties in PPPs manifest depend on the certainty of the environment. Due to the 
mentioned characteristics of PPPs, such as the rare occurrence of contracts, the long 
life cycle of the agreement, and complex revenue streams and traffic volume studies, 
environments associated with PPPs are relatively more unstable than environments 
associated with traditional delivery methods. This environmental instability increases 





A PPP model is a mixture of an economic model and a political model, thus, the PPP 
model is greater in complexity than the two models discussed. In a PPP model, 
different entities have different goals; the public agency tries o maximize the social 
benefits and minimize the political costs. The private agency tries o maximize the 
Rate of Return (ROR) on their investment and minimize the capital cost. Therefore, 
high opportunism from both sides is encountered in PPPs, making the negotiations 
more expensive for both sides. PPPs are also associated with high levels of behavioral 
uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. As a result, transaction costs associated 
with procurement of PPPs is higher in terms of feasibility studies and negotiations. 
 
It should be noted that aside from negotiating transaction costs (during initiation and 
procurement phases of the project), any PPP will have monitoring and enforcement 
costs over the life cycle of the project (after procurement during the contract 
management phase). To better understand the effect of environmental uncertainty on 
monitoring and enforcement costs in PPPs, the results of Ryu’s (2006) analysis can be 
used to better explain the relationship between environmental uncertaity and 
interdependence magnitude with transaction costs.  If a PPP contract is negotiated 
professionally, the risks and rewards in the PPP agreement are fairly sh red between 
the two parties, and the interdependence magnitude of the transaction is h gh. In other 
words, a concrete PPP agreement should be negotiated in a way that if the project is 
successful, both parties can reap the benefits; if the project fails, both parties bear the 
losses. In this case according to Ryu’s analysis, the monitoring cost will be lower or 
there will be a high-monitoring cost based on the level of uncertainty. 
• Uncertainty and Interdependence Magnitude 
 
Figure 7 shows how uncertainty and interdependence magnitude can affect the total 
transaction cost, as well as transaction costs during initiation and negotiation phases 
(N), and transaction costs during monitoring and enforcement phases (M). Cells 2 and 
3 represent traditional delivery methods in which due to the characteristi s of the 
contract, the environmental uncertainty is lower, and so the total transaction costs are 




as in PPPs, with the total amount of 
uncertainty associated with the project
represent the situation in which success or failure of one party is not highly related to 
the success or failure of the other party. For insta ce 
cost overruns is borne only by the contractor.  Cells 
which risks and rewards are fairly divided between the two parties. In other words, 
they represent a high interdependence and a perfect partnership.  According to Ryu’s 
analysis, when the interdependence magnitude is high, 
contract are each vulnerable to retaliation from the other. Thus, an attempt to control 
different entities through 
represents highly uncertain environments that lead to t
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distributed between contract
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Figure 7: The Transaction cost quadrant (modified from Ryu, 2006)
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on the literature review, we know that transaction cost is an important factor in PPPs, 
and many scholars and experts and have emphasized the importance of this t pic.  
There are also some theoretical studies (Ho, 2009) which covers the importance of 
different factors associated with transaction costs in PPPs. The literature review also 
reveals some empirical studies about transaction cost measurement in some PPP 
projects in European countries, and reports the results of those studies. 
 
Although there have been some attempts to measure the transaction costs in PPP 
projects, those projects are either theoretical discussions, or based on data from PPP 
projects in other parts of the world such as EU. The concern hre is that the PPP 
program in the US is very different than the PPP program in EU. For instance the PPP 
program is still in the US, and there are not enough guidelines and standards av ilable 
to practice PPP. Also, the legal system in the US is different which makes the PPP 
process flowchart in the US different than the one in EU. We can also add the effect 
of different financial structure, procurement legislations and also the effect of 
bureaucracy to the mentioned list. Therefore; those numbers cannot be necessarily 
true about PPP infrastructure projects in the US. 
 
It should be also mentioned that those studies cover transaction costs in a very broad 
way, and report only the overall transaction cost o the project for the private section, 
winning bidder and loser bidders. Although those numbers are very important, but if 
one want to have a more accurate estimation about transaction cost during different 
phases of the project and for different transaction activities, there is a need for a better 
accounting system that can track and record transaction cost items and give a more 
useful reports based on different filtering options. The next chapter of this study 
focuses on developing such accounting system in order to increase the accuracy of 
cost accounting system for PPP infrastructure projects, and so the accuracy of 





Chapter 3: Transaction Cost Accounting Model  
3.1 Introduction: 
As literature review suggests, there are many inconsistencies in definition of 
transaction costs and so many difficulties in measurement and recording such costs. 
Usually, it is very difficult to find data about transaction costs of PPP infrastructure 
projects in the US, and even the available data are not consistent. This issue will be 
further discussed in the following chapter while comparing two case studies about the 
I-495 HOT lanes project in Virginia, and the I-595 improvements project in Florida. 
These case studies emphasize the need for a better accounting sys em to identify and 
track transaction cost items in order to better analyze transaction osts in PPP 
infrastructure projects in the US.   
A PPP project accounting system is not very different than a normal construction 
projects. However, since the PPP process is more complex than normal c nstruction 
projects, understanding the whole process of the project is the first step in developing 
a cost accounting system. It is very important to lay different tasks during the life 
cycle of the project, and evaluate what are the main important factors that the cost 
accounting system should be able to restore. After developing the project t ansaction 
activities, there is a need to do a cost breakdown structure to evaluate the cost items 
associated with different tasks. Those cost items will be mapped to transaction 
activities to account for all different costs incurred during a PPP transaction. Then the 
cost coding system will be defined based on the requirements for rest ring data, and 
also characteristics of PPP projects.  Figure 8 shows different st ps used in this 








Figure 8: Transaction Cost Accounting System Development
 
 
This chapter develops a platform to identify the main factors that affect transaction 
costs of PPPs in the US, and develops a cost accounting model to identify and track 
transaction costs in PPPs in the US.
developed based on the information available from PPP infrastructure projects in the 
US, and procurement legislat
in the US in each stage of the PPP process flowchart will be identified and discussed 
in section 2. Section 3 presents a cost breakdown structure (CBS) for different 
transaction cost activities in PPP projects. Section 4 is about mapping the PPP process 
flowchart with different transaction cost items in order to develop a cost accounting 
model to identify and track transaction costs of a PPP infrastructure project. 
coding system is developed and discussed in this section. 
 
3.2 PPP Transaction Process 
Before developing a CBS, it is necessary to have a general PPP process flowchart 
based on federal and local PPP legislations and regulations. It should be noted that the 
legislation and regulations vary among different states, which result in different PPP
process flowcharts. However, in this research we have come up with a general 
process flowchart which can 
PPP process flowchart
PPP cost breakdown structure
Cost coding system (mapping cost 





 A PPP process flowchart for the US will be 
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In order to develop this process flowchart, PPP legis ature in three different states, 
Texas, Virginia and Florida, 
states was studied by conducting interviews with each state
Transportation (DOT) officials. Figure 
being developed based on the information obtained from interviews and legislat
 
Figure 9: PPP Process transaction activities flowchart in the U.S.
 
In any PPP project, there are some stages that occur through the life cycle of the 
project: project initiation, project procurement and contract management. Some 
people may combine project initiation and procurement together, but in this section, 
they are discussed separately to emphasize the difference between PPP lifecycle and 
traditional delivery lifecycle. It should also be noted that 
based on the PPP procurement of three states in theUS: Texas, Florida and Virginia.
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3. Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB) Review and 
Recommendation 
4. Final Selection of Detailed Proposals 
5. Negotiate Draft Interim/Comprehensive Agreement 
6. Execution of Interim/Comprehensive Agreement  
 
Project initiation occurs during the early stages of the PPP life cycle and is a 
component for both the bidders and owners (government). Generally, in PPPs, the 
DOT receives an unsolicited proposal  from a private entity who has a business idea 
and is interested in investing in a project. The first response of the DOT will be to 
assign this project to a DOT project manager and select team members who will help 
facilitate the evaluation of the proposal. An evaluation of the cost and elements of the 
bid will be performed by the DOT to select the best delivery method for the project, 
and evaluate whether the DOT can fund the project through their own resourc , or if 
they should use a PPP. If the preliminary evaluation of the project passes the 
minimum screening standards of the DOT and they decide to form a partnership with 
a private company, then the project will be officially registered with DOT and a 
Request for proposal (RFP) or a Bid Advertisement  will be prepared nd issued in 
order to start a competitive procurement. It should be noted that DOTs usually have a 
prescreening of bidders in order to prequalify the bidders who can enter the process. 
 
The next step after project initiation is project procurement. For the bidder, that 
means responding to the RFP or the Bid Announcement. In this step for the 
government or owner, various proposals received from potential private partners will 
be evaluated in order to select the best proposal. Usually, DOTs use advisors and 
consultants to prepare a business plans, feasibility studies, and also to sist in legal 
and contracting issues. After selecting the best proposal,. The DOT will begin 
negotiating with the winning bidder.  It should be noted that since selection of the 
best proposal in PPPs is a subjective process, the best proposal is not necessarily the 
lowest bid, although different states mandate a low bid award.  Thisprocess usually 




about 2 years for I-595- since DOT will need to obtain the necessary permits and 
resolve issues that may arise. Sharing risks and rewards is also done through 
extensive negotiations by developing some provisions in the contract which explains 
the risk / reward mechanism. They should also conduct public hearings which usually 
take place during the planning and environmental phases.  There are specific 
requirements when conducting hearings such as time notification, recording of 
testimony, public comment period after the public hearing, etc. The last step of the 
procurement process is signing the contract. 
 
Once the procurement process is complete, the contract management phase begins. 
This phase can be divided into two sub-phases: construction contract manage e t 
and operations and maintenance (O & M) contract management. During construction, 
the DOT should establish an office which will mainly be responsible for quality 
control to ensure the construction follows industry standards and contract 
specifications. This team is also responsible for document management and controls 
to keep all the necessary data for DOT records. Another responsibility of DOT during 
the construction phase is holding audits and informational meetings to make certain 
they collaborate with the public because public support is very crucial for ny project, 
specifically PPP projects that impose toll on roadways. That is because in general 
people are sensitive in being charged for tolls, and DOTs do not want to  face polital 
costs of loosing public supports. DOT is also responsible for the O & Mquality 
controls during the operation phase of the project. They should regularly check the 
facility, toll rates and toll incomes, and the financial status of the project. In some 
contracts such as I-595, DOT is responsible for collecting tolls so they should also 
consider the transaction cost of Toll collection in their estimations. In most contracts, 
there is a mechanism to share income or bear losses, thus, DOT staff should monitor 





3.3 Cost Breakdown Structure and Transaction Cost Mapping 
The next step after developing and identifying the main factors that affect transaction 
costs in different stages of PPP represented by a process flowchart, is developing a 
cost breakdown structure in order to map different cost accounts with every process 
activity. Figure 10 illustrates a CBS from a public agency point f view where 
transaction costs are divided into two main factors: initiation / procurement costs and 
contract management costs. Initiation and procurement costs are rel t d to the first 
two phases of the PPP process flowchart and are mainly related to the activities prior 
to signing the contract. Contract management costs are mainly related to the activities 
that occur after closing out procurement of the contract (after signing the contract) 
such as O&M quality controls, contract enforcement, and dispute resolutions.  
Level 3 of the CBS represents whether the cost has been incurred internally by the 
state DOT or incurred externally due to having consultants or advisors. It should be 
noted that the term external refers to payments of DOT are not on the payroll system 
of DOTs. In other words, DOT receives bills for such services and p ys the bills. This 
is different than when DOT pays salary to its employees.   
Level 4 represents different activities that can result in tra saction costs.  Level 5 
divides the costs associated with those activities into two categories: direct costs 
which can be directly calculated based on resources (in terms of lab r hour, 
equipment or material spent to accomplish those activities) or indirect costs which 
can be calculated based on assigning overhead and general administratio  costs to the 






Figure 10: Transaction Cost Breakdown Structure
 
 
It should be noted that given the current available 
collect data for the contract management phase becaus  the PPP model in the US is 
still very new and there are not enough projects and data to support this section of the 
model. However, the data for 









information, it is very difficult to 
the procurement phase of some projects in three 





































Financial controls during 






















for preciseness and accuracy. The external transaction costs associated with PPP 
projects are easy to obtain since most of these costs are reco ded as separate bills in 
the accounting system of projects. However, it is very difficult to obtain detailed data 
about the internal transaction costs because each state has a different accounting 
system and they usually do not record this level of detail.  
The second level of CBS developed in this study can be used as a tracking model by 
state DOTs to record and track the transaction costs associated wi h PPP 
infrastructure development projects. This model is essential for state DOTs because 
according to their PPP legislation, they can calculate the transaction cost that state 
DOTs incur while delivering a project using PPPs and add it to the to al cost of the 
project in order to be reimbursed for their costs. This model is greater in detail and 
helps state DOTs to track and record transaction costs in different levels of a CBS.  
3.4 PPP cost coding system  
 
After extensive efforts to collect data regarding the transaction cost of infrastructure 
PPP projects in the US, there has only been little success in collecting data. As it will 
be presented in the next chapter in case studies, even the collected data is not 
consistent. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is an inconsistency in the way 
transaction costs are defined, tracked and recorded in different states. It is apparent 
that there is a need for a standard accounting model which can be used in different 
PPP projects in order to collect and record transaction cost items. This section will 
describe how to develop such systems by mapping between the developed CBS in the 
previous section and transaction cost accounts. 
 
The accounting model that has been developed in this paper is similar to the cost 
accounting system which has been developed by Construction Specification Institute 
(CSI). However, this system is based on special characteristics of PPPs, and it is 
designed in a way that maximizes the accessibility to the transaction cost items. This 
system can generate reports based on different filters in orderto detailed transaction 






Figure 11: Cost Coding System 
 
As illustrated in figure 11, the cost coding system consists of two separate numbers. 
The first number represents the projects ID, and the second number represents the 
project cost center. Project ID consists of 7 digits 
on requirements. The first 
type of project; for instance railway, roadway, tunnel, bridge, etc. The last 3 digits 
represent the project number. 
 
Similarly the project cost center consists of 6 d
incures the cost; for instance public sector, winning bidder or loser bidders. The 
second number represents 
mentioned PPP process flowchart in 
transaction activities in each phase again from figure 
whether DOT paid those costs through a bill (
its own employees or office budget (internal). The fifth
which have been consumed for that activity such as manpower, equipments or 
material. This is explained in the cost coding matrix in figure 12.  The last digit shows 
43 
– it can be more or less depending 
2 digits represent the state. The third digit represents the 
 
igits. The first digit represents who 
the three different phases of a PPP agreement based on the 
Figure 9. The third digit represents different 
9. The fourth digit tells us 
external) or through normal salaries to 





whether those costs are incurred directly, or they ave bee
instance overhead allocation.
Figure 12: Cost Accounts Coding Matrix
 
In this model, the consulting cost is usually based on lump sum or hourly rate bills 
the design that state DOTs receive from 
are calculated based on labor
calculated by calculating the number of people who have worked on each project, the 
number of hours that they have spent, and th
be manager(s), permanent project team members, or supporting staff who are DOT 
employees that have been temporarily 
are also office expenses and travel costs which c
material and equipment costs. However, there are some other transaction costs which 
cannot be tracked directly. These costs are related to the overhead and general 
administration costs in DOTs. An overhead rate based on the
for similar projects in each DOT can be used in order to account for these costs. The 
model also accounts for inflation rates and price escalation adjustments since 
transaction costs of PPPs occur over life cycle of PPP agreements wh
several or many years, causing inflation rates to play a significant role in the accuracy 
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Chapter 4: Case study 
4.1 Introduction 
The model developed in chapter 3 is developed in a way that it can restore a  much 
useful information as possible about different cost items regarding ifferent project 
activities in different phases of the project. This model will enable accountants to 
better record and track the transaction cost, and helps researchers and estimators to 
have access to more detailed information about transaction cost centers. However, 
this model should be validated in order to proof that recording transaction costs in 
more details will help DOTs to better assess transaction costs, and so get reimbursed 
by  project financial resources. 
 
In order to validate the model, we have contacted 7 different projects in hree 
different states which are believed to be the pioneers in PPP infrastructure programs 
in the US: Texas, Virginia and Florida. Table 2 shows the information of different 
projects which were initially selected and contacted for transaction cost data.  
 
Only 2 out of these seven projects responded, and sent us the financial information 
about their transaction costs. Therefore, two case studies have been conducted in this 
chapter. The first case study is I-595 improvements in Florida, and the second case 
study is I-495 HOT lanes in Virginia. The following two sections f this chapter will 
study these two cases, followed by a discussion section which will compare the two 
cases with the model, and also drives conclusions from the alignment of the case 
studies with the model. This chapter validates the point that a better accounting 
system can help state DOTs in better tracking and recording transaction costs 










Table 2: Targeted PPP Infrastructure Projects 



















Delivery/Contract Method DBFOM     DBFOM DBFOM DBFOM DBFOM 
Construction Duration 5 years     5 years 5 years 5   
Operation Duration 80 years     35 years 52 years 50 52 years 
Fiscal Year approved 2008 2006 2010 2008 2009 2007 2009 
Funding sources             
State and federal               
Concessionaire's financing                
GARVEE               
GO bond               
TIFIA Loan $589  157.3   $603  $800  $430  $650  
Private activity $589        $400    $398  
Senior Banking Debt   859   $781.10    $685.80    
Senior term Facility Debt         $400      
State infrastructure bank 
loan               








funds       
  $409      $232        
Equity               
Private 350.00 270.00   $207.70  $598.50  $209.80  $426  
State         $445    $573  
Revenue (toll or interest)   55.3   $10  $34.50  $2.30    
Check total $1,937  $1,342  $0  $1,834  $2,678  $1,328  $2,047  
Total according to 
documents 1938.00 1341.60   $1,833.60  $2,678  
$1,327.9
0  $2,047  
Equity/total 0.18 0.20   0.11 0.22 0.16 0.21 
 
 
4.2 Case study 1: I-595 (Florida) 
4.2.1 Project description 
The I-595 corridor was opened to traffic in 1989, coordinating the movement of high 
traffic volumes connecting western parts of the Southeast Florida region with the 
north-south freeway and principal roadways to the east, including I-75, Florida's 




development of the neighborhoods along the project corridor, and because of these 
developments the travel demand within the corridor increased at a gross rate more 
than the long-range traffic forecasts used in the traffic studies of the project. 
Therefore, the need for improvements of the project was paramount in order to meet 
the new demands. 
 
Given the high traffic demands, the expansion of I-595 had been considered sinc  
1994. The I-595 Corridor Roadway Improvements project was initiated preliminarily 
to increase the traffic capacity of I-595 to meet the new demands. Thi  project 
consists of the reconstruction and widening of the I-595 mainline and also all 
associated improvements to bridges and ramps from the I-75/Sawgrass Expressway 
interchange to the I-595/I-95 interchange. The total length of this project is 
approximately 10.5 miles, and the total cost is estimated to reach$1,833.6 million (in 
present value in 2009 dollars, given a 5% discount rate).    
 
A major component of the project is the construction of three express toll lanes 
known as I-595Express. These lanes will serve express traffic and will be operated as 
managed lanes with variable tolls to optimize traffic flow. The revenue generated 
from these lanes will be used to pay back project debt and also is prfit fo  equity 






Figure 13: I-595 Improvements map (Source: Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT)) 
 
The project is being implemented as a public-private partnership between Florida 
DOT (FDOT) and I-595 Express, LLC (ACS Infrastructure Development) as 
Concessionaire to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain the roadway for a 35-
year term. FDOT will provide management oversight of the contract; will install, test, 
operate and maintain all tolling equipment for the express lanes; d will set the toll 
rates and retain the toll revenue. 
 
Due to the complexity of the project agreement as a Design-Build-Finance-Operate-
Maintain (DBFOM), there are many consultants and advisors associated with this 
project. The advisors of this project are listed as follows:  
 
To the sponsor: 
• Legal Advisor: Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP  
• Financial Advisor: Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc.  
• Technical Advisor: Scott Wilson, Plc.  
 
 To Lender: 






• Legal Advisor: Nossaman LLP - legal 
• Financial Advisor: Jeffrey A. Parker & Associates, Inc.  
• Technical Advisor: Reynolds, Smith and Hills, Inc.  
• Construction Oversight: The Corradino Group  
 
To USDOT TIFIA Joint Project Office (JPO): 
• TIFIA Legal Advisor: Hawkins Delafield & Wood LLP 
• TIFIA Financial Advisor: Taylor-DeJongh 
 
Table 3: I-595 Improvements Project Description 
Lead Public Agency: Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) 
Estimated Cost $1.835 billion 
Contract Type Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) 
Contract Duration  35 years (including construction) 
Construction Begins 2009 
Operation Begins Spring 2014 (estimated) 
Facility Ownership FDOT 
Fare Setting Authority FDOT 
Availability and 
Acceptance Payments 
FDOT will pay the concessionaire $65.9 million per year 
in availability payments as well $685.6 million in facility 
acceptance payments for the timely construction of the 
facility within pre-defined standards. The concessionaire 
would be eligible to receive availability payments once 
substantial completion on the project is achieved and the 
project operating period begins. Substantial completion 
includes the construction of all traffic lanes, which is 
expected to take place in 2014. 
Value-for-Money 
Analysis 
A value-for-money analysis in 2007 concluded that a 
DBFOM with availability payments would provide a 
greater value to the public sector (about $24M to $104M) 
compared to a DBFOM contract while concessionaire 
keeps the revenues generated from the project.  
An updated value-for-money analysis in 2009 found that 
the $65.9M annual availability payment was 8 percent 
lower than the $71.9M payment that was estimated prior 




It should also be noted that FDOT used a 2 step procurement process as follows in 
order to enhance the procurement process of this projects. A Request for 
Qualification (RFQ) was released after publishing a Project Information 
Memorandum (PIM) on October 2007. Six different private ventures submitted their 
Statements of Qualification, and FDOT selected four of them in the first step to make 
a short list. A Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued for the four short-listed 




Figure 14: I-595 improvements procurement process (Source:  (Parker, 2008)) 
 
4.2.2 Project financing 
The financing package for this project is relatively unique in that the concessionaire is 
raising funds through different sources. The senior bank loans ($782 million) come 
from a 12-bank club (Spanish, French and Australian banks), and the TIFIA loans 
($603 million) are exactly equal to 33% of the total eligible costs f the project. The 
I-595 Express, LLC, is the official borrower for the TIFIA loan. The interest rate on 
the TIFIA loan on this project is 3.64 % (the current TIFIA interest rate is 4.74% for a 
35-year loan as of Thursday, April 15, 2010).  
 
From the concessionaire’s perspective, the maximum use of TIFIA loans decreases 
the money required for debt service due to the lower TIFIA interes  rate (4.74% for a 




loan), and enhances the free cash flow (FCF) of the project. The first interest payment 
on the TIFIA loan is scheduled for June 2014 (the ramp up period is 5 years after 
project completion in 2009). Principal repayments are scheduled to begin in 2031 and 
final maturity is scheduled for June 2042.  The TIFIA loan is backed up by a lien on 
availability payments made by FDOT to I-595 Express, LLC.  
 
There are also some fees associated with TIFIA loan as follows: 
• The TIFIA JPO will require each applicant to pay a non-refundable 
Application Fee of $50,000. 
• Each borrower will be required to pay a Transaction Fee equal to the costs 
incurred by the TIFIA JPO in negotiating the credit agreement. This credit 
processing fee will typically range from $200,000- $300,000. 
• Borrowers will be required to pay an $11,500 Loan Servicing Fee annually, 
due by November 15. 
• Borrowers also will be required to pay a Monitoring Fee as defined in the 
credit agreement. 
Depending on the life cycle of the TIFIA loan and also some other costs of the JPO in 
negotiations, the TIFIA fee may range from $700,000 to $1,100,000. 
 
The bank debt on this project has an interest rate of 6.58% and a 10-year maturity. 
There is an option to refinance these loans later through the life cycl of the project 
by new bank loans, bond issues, and/or Private Activity Bonds (PABs). If there is a 
gain due to refinancing the loans at a better interest rate, FDOT would take a share of 
the gains equal to 50% of the gain. In addition, FDOT has the option to purchase the 
project debt, if it is in default. (Minnesota Department of Transportation, 2009) 
 
In addition, the consortium partners have agreed to provide an estimat d $208 million 
in equity. This is almost equal to 11.3% of the total cost of the proj ct which is lower 
than the equity / total cost ration on other projects (about 15% to 20% - refer to 
Appendix 4). Table 4 lists the sources of funds, and share of each source in the total 





Table 4: Source of Funds for I-595 Improvements Project 
Source Amount % of total cost 
Bank Loans $782 million 42.6 
TIFIA $603 million 32.9 
Equity $208 million 11.3 
Revenues $10 million 0.5 
FDOT Grants $232 Million 12.7 
Total  1, 835 million 100.00 




4.2.3 Project transaction cost 
 
In order to received the transaction cost of I-595 Improvements project, th  project 
manager of the project, financial management office, and the financial advisor of the 
project were contacted separately.  Table 5 summarizes the results of the information 
which was obtained through different sources for this project. 
 
 
Table 5: I-595 improvements project transaction cost  reported by FDOT 
I-595  
Source  Amount ($ )  % of Total   
Financial Advisors  2,200,000  10%  
Architecture & Engineering Consultants  14,850,000  70%  
CEI  1,900,000  9%  
Legal Consultants  
2,400,000  11%  
Business Consultants  
N/A  - --  
FDOT Internal Costs  
N/A  - ---  
Total TC  21,350,000  100%  
 






Having a quick look at the above table reveals that FDOT is not recrding detailed 
data about different transaction activities.  It also shows that FDOT is not using an 
internal time / cost allocation system in order to track the int rnal transaction costs 
that it incurs. However, they may have accounted for those internal cost items in the 
Construction Engineering and Inspection (CEI) section. It should be noted that the 
above transaction costs are the transaction costs of the project till July 2009. In other 
words, those transaction costs are mainly procurement cost of I-505 project from 
FDOT point of view which is approximately 1.1% of the total cost of the project.  
 
There are also some other cost items that have been reported for this project which 
are mainly related to the operation phase of the project. Table 6 summarizes those 
items. The top cells of this table also shows how FDOT is using cost centers based on 
































-595 Improvements Project 





4.3 Case Study 2: I-495 (Virginia) 
4.3.1 Project description 
The I-495 HOT Lanes project is a 14 mile highway project on the Capital Beltway in 
Northern Virginia. The project will involve the construction of four high-occupancy-
toll (HOT) lanes along the Capital Beltway (I-495) between the Springfield 
Interchange and the Dulles Tollway. There will be two HOT Lanes in each direction, 
which will employ electronic tolling and dynamic pricing to manage traffic flow. 
High occupancy vehicles with three or more people (HOV 3+), buses, law 
enforcement vehicles, and emergency vehicles will be exempt from paying tolls.   
 
The toll amount will be based on demand and will fluctuate throughout the day to 
reflect real-time traffic conditions. The concessionaire is not restricted in its ability to 
set toll rates and impose increases. Figure 15 provides a map of the HOT lanes 
project, including the planned nine entry and exit points to the general purpose lanes. 




Figure 15: Representative Cross-Section (Source: I-495 Project Website) 
 
 
Transurban/Fluor signed an 85year contract with VDOT to design, build, finance and 
operate, and maintain this project for 85 years through a concession agreement. The 





i. The project is delivered through a DBFOM contract for HOT lanes, 
greenfields project. 
ii.  Project procurement was initiated as a result of an unsolicited proposal that 
yielded no competitive proposals. 
iii.  Private Activity Bonds (PAB) and TIFIA loans are used in the financi l pool 
for the project. 
iv.  The concession duration is 85 years which represents the longest term for a 
greenfields project in the United States (Laursen, 2009). 
v. The construction duration of the project is scheduled to be 5 years. 
vi. The procurement process of the project started in 1994, and finished in 2008. 
The total procurement duration is 15 years. Table 7 shows the project 
procurement timeline for I-495 HOT lanes.  
 
Table 7: I-495 Procurement Timeline 
1994  VDOT completes a Major Investment Study, concluding highway improvements promoting 
the use of High Occupancy Vehicles and bus travel would be the most effectiv  strategy to 
serve current and future demand on the Beltway. 
1998  Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and VDOT initiate an Environme tal 
Assessment of a variety of plans to improve the Beltway; In response to public feedback, 
the FHWA escalates its review from an Environmental Assessment to a Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS). 
2002  FHWA approves the EIS, including three HOV alternatives and 15 specific concepts to 
improve the Beltway; VDOT seeks community input on the plans during three public 
hearings and significantly scales back the project in response to public concerns. 
2002 In June 2002, Fluor submitted an unsolicited proposal to VDOT. In accordance with the 
Implementation Guidelines of the PPTA, VDOT posted and published a noticeof h  
conceptual proposal. No additional responses were received as a result of this 
announcement. 
2003 In July 2003, VDOT approved Fluor’s conceptual proposal and Fluor submitted a detailed 
proposal in October 2003 
2004  VDOT hosts public meetings to present and solicit public input on both a tradition l HOV 
and a HOT lanes plan; 64 percent of comments received from the public support the HOT 
lanes plan. 
2004 Negotiations with Fluor and Transurban started in October 2004. 
2005 On January 19, the Commonwealth Transportation Board selects the HOT lanes pl  as the 
locally preferred alternative; On April 18, FHWA signs the Final EIS and releas s it for 
public comment; After a public review period, the National Capital Region Tra sportation 
Planning Board votes to include the Beltway HOT lanes project in the region’s Constrained 




2005  After 5 months of negotiation, the original comprehensive agreement was signed on April 
25, 2005. 
2006  On June 29, FHWA releases its Record of Decision that approved selection of the HOT 
lanes plan for the Capital Beltway. 
2007  FHWA releases a re-evaluation of the Record of Decision and determines proj ct scope 
enhancements have no significant environmental impact; On December 21, TIFIA loan of 
the project was approved. VDOT and Fluor-Transurban sign final partnership agreement, 
and , an amended contract was signed to account for the transfer of the righ s and 
responsibilities of Fluor -Transurban to Capital Beltway Express LLC, a company that was 
created to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain the project. 
2008 In July 2008, project construction began, and the construction is expected to be complted 
in 2013. 
 (Source: VDOT) 
 
It should be noted that project cost estimates increased after the receipt of the 
unsolicited proposal, which included a high-level overview of total capital costs. 
During the review of project feasibility and the public involvement process, project 
scope and costs increased. After signing the concessionaire between VDOT and 
Flour-Transurban in 2007, the agreement was approved in 2008 and procurement was 
completed officially in 2008 by VDOT. In July 2008, project construction began, and 
the project is expected to be completed in 2013. Table 8 summarizes the main 
elements of the I-495 HOT Lanes Project.  
  
Table 8: I-495 HOT Lanes Project Description 
Public Agency:  of Transportation (VDOT)  
Project 
Description  
Construct 14-mile, HOT lanes with two lanes in each direction on 
the Capital Beltway (I-495). The project will also involve the 
replacement of more than 50 bridges and overpasses.  
Estimated Cost  $1.998 billion  
Contract Type  Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain (DBFOM)  
Contract 
Duration  
85-years (5-year construction and 80 years operation)  
Constr  Begins  July 2008  
Operation Begins  Mid-2013  
Revenue Sharing  Actual revenues that are in excess of the base case financial model 
are shared with VDOT at increasing percentages.  
Facility 
Ownership  
VDOT retains ownership and oversight to ensure that the project 
will be constructed, operated and maintained in accordance with the 
contract.  




Authority  to set tolls.  
Value for Money  Because the contract was awarded after the receipt of an unsolicited 
proposal, it appears that VDOT achieved some cost savings by 
avoiding a full-scale competitive procurement. However, this does 
not mean the total cost of project is less because VDOT could get a 
better price, or a lower concession period if there was a more 
competitive bidding.  
 
4.3.2 Project financing 
The financing package included a mix of TIFIA loans, Private Activity Bond (PAB), 
a grant from the Commonwealth, private equity, and interest income on the privately 
issued debt. The project has a debt to equity ratio of approximately 60/40, including 
the grant funds provided by the state. The private partner is supposed to raise enough 
funds to cover 80% of the total cost of the project.  
 
The TIFIA loan agreement was signed on December 21 2007. TIFIA interest 
payments are expected to begin in 2018, which is 5 years after construction is 
completed (ramp up period). Principal repayments are scheduled to begin in 2033, 20 
years after operation of the project begins. The TIFIA loan is structured  with five 
years of capitalized interest during construction followed by five years of partially 
capitalized interest during ramp-up; then current interest only for 15 years followed 
by 15 years of interest plus principal.  This payment plan helps the project to 
substantially free cash flow and increase the debt capacity of the project. 
 
 
Revenues generated from tolls are estimated to cover all project costs, including debt 
service, O & M, transaction costs. The first thing that will be paid e ch year is O & M 
expenses. Next, senior bonds will be paid as well as TIFIA. After paying for junior 
bonds, the private company can collect its return on equity.  
 
The ROR equity will be calculated each year, and based on the actual ROR, VDOT 
may get a share of the profit based on revenue sharing mechanism designed in the 







Table 9: Sources of Funds for I-495 HOT Project 
Source Amount ($ Million) % of Total 
TIFIA $585.6  29% 
Private Activity Bonds (PABs) $585.5  29% 
Private Equity $348.7 17% 
State of Virginia  $408.9  20% 
Interest Income $69.3  3% 
Total $1,998.0  100% 
Source: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
 
 
Project Transaction Cost 
VDOT reported their transaction costs as follows:  
 
 
Table 10: I-495 HOT Lanes Project Transaction Costs Reported by VDOT 
Source Amount ($ ) % of Total 
Financial Advisors 1,520,000 30% 
Architectural & Engineering 
Consultants 
280,000 6% 
Legal Consultants 257,000 5% 
Business Consultants 1,345,000 27% 
VDOT Internal Costs 1,600,000 32% 
Total 5,002,000 100.00% 
Source: Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) 
The first thing that can be noticed about their reported transaction cost is lack of a 
detailed cost breakdown structure (CBS). The total cost of this project according to 
VDOT is $1.929 M. Based on this data the reported transaction costs of the I-495 
HOT lanes project is only %0.26 of the capital cost of the project. A comparison 
between these data and estimates in other PPP projects reveals that the transaction 




projects. For instance, TxDOT uses %10 as a rule of thumb to account for transaction 
costs in their PPP projects. The public sector pays usually 2-4% of the total capital 
cost of the project during procurement phases of a PPP project in the EU (Dudkin & 
Välilä, 2005).  Further investigations reveal that there are different offices in VDOT 
which work on PPP projects. Based on the discussion in Section 4 of this paper, the 
budget of those offices should be divided among all different PPP projects. For 
instance, according to the report to the Commonwealth of Virginia, the budget of 
Enterprise Applications Public-Private-Partnership Office (EAPPPO) in 2008 was 
$11M. In another report (Annual Report on Initiatives for Outsourcing, Privatization 
and Downsizing within VDOT, 2009) VDOT reports the total cost of the projects 
under PPTA as $9.12B, meaning the cost of I-495 HOT Lanes projects accounts for 
33% of the total PPP projects in Virginia. So, it is logical to add 33% of the total 
budget of the offices which work for PPP projects to the transaction ost of I-495 
HOT lanes project. VDOT also reports its obligations for this project as $550M in the 
construction phase (Annual Report on Initiatives for Outsourcing, Privatization and 
Downsizing within VDOT, 2009); while according to Table 2, the obligations of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia is $408.9M. It is not clear where the $141.1M difference 
between these two reported numbers is accounted for.  
 
It should also be noted that VDOT has not reported all the probable tr nsaction costs 
of this project. The reported transaction costs are only related to the procurement 
phase of the project, however, there are more transaction activities during the 
project’s life cycle which have not been addressed. For instance: 
• Back office operations related to the collection of electronic tolls.  
• ROW acquisition costs. Based on the contract, VDOT will initiate and handle 
condemnation proceedings if the concessionaire is unable to reach a 
negotiated settlement with the affected landowners. 
• VDOT should do regular and quality control inspections to ensure the 





Another reason that the reported transaction cost of this project is l ss than expected 
may be the lack of competition. It should be noted that the reported transaction cost is 
the transaction cost during searching and negotiation phases. While VDOT did 
publish a public notice regarding the receipt of Fluor’s conceptual proposal, it did not 
receive any other competing proposals. This can be a huge disadvantage ssociated 
with this transaction which can result in higher contractual costs and also higher 
monitoring and enforcement transaction costs later during other phases of the 
project’s life cycle.  There are also some provisions in the contract hat create 
obligations to VDOT which may result in higher transaction costs in the future. For 
instance, back office operations related to the collection of electronic tolls on the 
HOT lanes, establishing a management committee to coordinate operatins of the 
HOT and general purpose lanes, ROW acquisitions if they exceed  $42,011,750.00, 
handling condemnation if the concessionaire is unable to reach a negotiated 
settlement with the affected land owner. VDOT is also responsible for the acquisition 
of ROW related to the following: (1) the remediation of hazardous materials; (2) 
property outside of the project area; and (3) the construction of the HOT lanes 
operation center. VDOT is also obligated to pay the concessionaire about 70% of the 
average toll, if the number of HOV vehicles exceeds 24% of total traffic for 45 








4.4 Comparison of Case Studies and Conclusions 
In order to better compare the performance of VDOT and FDOT in terms of tracking 
and recording transaction costs of I-494 HOT lanes and I-595 Improvements projects, 
the percentage of each category of transaction cost from the total transaction cost is 
calculated in table 11. The numbers derived in this table better illust ated that FDOT 
has done a better job in terms of recording the transaction costs. Their reported 
transaction cost (1.1%) is much closer to the transaction cost of PPP projects in EU 
(2%), however, it is still less. This can be because the table repr sents the reported 
transaction cost of I-595 Improvements till July 2009, which does not include the 
transaction cost of the project during the operation phase. So, the total transaction 
cost of the project during the lifecycle of the project will increase.    
 
Table 11: Comparison of case studies 
I-495  I-595  
Source  Amount ($ )  % of total  Amount ($ )  % of Total  
Financial Advisors  1,520,000  30.39%  2,200,000  10%  
Arch & Eng Consultants  280,000  5.60%  14,850,000  70%  
CEI  N/A  ---  1,900,000  9%  
Legal Consultants  257,000  5.14%  2,400,000  11%  
Business Consultants  1,345,000  26.89%  N/A  - --  
VDOT Internal Costs  1,600,000  31.99%  N/A  - ---  
Total TC  5,002,000  100.00%  21,350,000  100%  
Project Cost  1,998,000.000  1,835,000,000  
TC/ total capital cost  0.3%  1.1%  
 
In order to demonstrate the importance of the cost accounting system in racking and 
recording transaction costs, the two different case studies are align d with the model 
in table 12, and the alignment results are drawn based on the reported transaction cost 
reported in figure 16 in order to show that more alignment with the cost accounting 







Table 12: Aligning case studies with the model





















Chapter 5:  Bayesian Transaction Cost Estimation Template  
5.1 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has covered some theoretical discussions about tr nsac ion costs in 
PPP infrastructure projects, its main sources and effects on the performance of the 
project. In Chapter 3, the main factors affecting transaction costs were evaluated, and 
the effect of each one of them on transaction costs during the life cycl  of the project 
is discussed.  Chapter 3 also covered the PPP process flowchart, and cost breakdown 
structure as well as a cost accounting system for tracking tra saction costs. Chapter 4 
described issues discussed in Chapter 3 by discussing the transaction cost items 
during the life cycle of a PPP infrastructure project in the context of two case studies, 
I-595 as a good example, and I-495 as a poor example. 
 
This chapter of the thesis aims to develop a transaction cost estimation model based 
on the information obtained in previous chapters. This chapter uses the discussion 
about the main sources of transaction costs in Chapter 3 to choose the four main  
inputs of the model: Number of Bidders, Project Value, Procurement time and PPP 
Maturity Level. The relationship between these four elements and different 
transaction cost categories within the lifecycle of the project is defined based on the 
work of other scholars covered in the literature review discussion of Chapter 2. Later, 
a Bayesian Network is used to connect different nodes in the model bas d on the 
relationships. The Bayesian Theory is used to relate the nodes because there is great 
uncertainty in the data, and the Bayesian Model is one of the models that can handle 
this uncertainty to produce acceptable results.  
 
To construct the Bayesian Network, there is a need for conditional probabilities or 
relationships. This model uses conditional relationships instead of conditional 
probabilities. For example, it defines P(TC of public l number of bidders) as the 




order to obtain this number, the data from an EIB study about transaction cost in PPP 
projects (Dudkin & Välilä study, 2005) is used. The next section of this c apter will 
discuss how the model is developed based on this data, and finally the last s ction of 
this chapter will discuss model limitations and the need for future research to make 
this model more accurate based on data from infrastructure PPP projects in the US.
 
5.2 Model Development Phases 
 




















Figure 17: TC-Estimation model development 
 
5.3 Variables and calculations in the excel based Model 
 
This model is an Excel-based model created based on Bayesian Theory. The variables 
of the model are the main four variables of transaction costs identif ed in Chapter 3, 
Section 2. These four variables are as follows:  
• Number of Bidders 
• Project Value 
• Procurement time (PPP Complexity) 
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For instance, the user will be asked to enter data for the number of bidders and project 
value based on the available data, and data for project complexity and PPP maturity 
level based on their best judgment. These data will be future interpre d to 
corresponding values based on some transitional equations which will relate the 
entered data to the data available from the EIB study about transactio  costs of PPP 
projects in the EU. For instance, they have reported the transaction cost of public 
sector as 2.1% for 1 bidder, 2.4% if 2 bidders, 3.4% if 3 bidders, and 3.1% if 4 
bidders. We can interpret the results as follows: 
 
If the user enters 1 bidder in the model, the model will automatically generate the 
corresponding number for it in the Bayesian Model as 0. 0 means no competition. 
Likewise, if the user puts 2, 3 or 4 and more the Excel sheet will ransform these 
numbers to 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 correspondingly. It is obvious that the model 
interprets having four or more bidders as 1, meaning there is a full leve  of 
competitive bidding process.  
 
It should be noted that the following data has been used in order to calculate the 
public transaction cost due to the number of bidders in the model. 
P (public TC l competitive bidding) = 0.035 
P (number of bidders l not competitive bidding) = 0.021 
To check this numbers we can plug the four numbers into the model and compare the 
output of the model with the data from the EIB study. 
 





Number in Excel 
Estimated Public 
TC by the Model 
Public TC 
Reported 
in EBI Report 
% 
difference 
1 0 0.021 0.021 0 
2 0.25 0.024 0.024 0 
3 0.75 0.028 0.034 9 % 






The same process is used to define all conditional relationships being used in the 
model. All relationships have been checked using a similar table in order to make 
sure that the output of the model is close to the reported data in the EIB study about 
transaction costs in PPP projects in EU. 
 
In the case of having more information about the project, we can calculate the 
posterior relationships based on the prior data using Bayesian Theorem and the 





Table 14: Conditional Relationships Defined Based on EIB Study Data 
A B P(AlB) 
Failing bidder TC Number of Bidders (competition) 0.08 
Failing bidder TC Number of Bidders (no competition) 0 
Failing bidder TC Capital Value (high) 0.03 
Failing bidder TC Capital Value (low) 0.02 
DOT TC Number of Bidders (competition) 0.035 
DOT TC Number of Bidders (no competition) 0.021 
DOT TC Capital Value (high) 0.02 
DOT TC Capital Value (low) 0.05 
DOT TC Procurement Time(long) 0.038 
DOT TC Procurement Time (Short) 0.018 
DOT TC Experience (high) 0.02 
DOT TC Experience (low) 0.04 
Winner Bidder TC Number of Bidders (competition) 0.031 
Winner Bidder TC Number of Bidders (no competition) 0.013 
Winner Bidder TC Experience (high) 0.035 
Winner Bidder TC Experience (low) 0.06 
Winner Bidder TC Capital Value (high) 0.05 
Winner Bidder TC Capital Value (low) 0.022 
Winner Bidder TC Procurement time(long) 0.06 








Figure 18: Screen Shot from Excel-based Transaction Cost Estimation Model 
 
  
5.4 Model Limits 
It should also be noted that many costs on the public side are step functions. For 
instance, the legal and financial costs may not be that different b tween a $700 
million project and a $1 billion project. This research has tried to eliminate this effect 
as much as possible by defining a utility function for different variables in the 
Bayesian transaction cost estimation model. This utility function is defined based on 
available data from PPP projects in Europe published by the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). This function is bounded by a maximum and minimum value based on 
the data, to account for the economy of scale.  
 
Also, one should be mindful of the fishing net problem - many projects in the U.S. 
incur costs and then never reach financial closure.  For example, on the Missouri 
Bridges, I understand (second-hand) that MoDOT elected to not hire sophisticated 
financial advisors at all nor legal advisors at first.  They brought in legal advisors 
after the project ran into trouble. In the end, the project failed as a PPP.  MoDOT 
Number of Bidders 2 200 15 2
Competitive 0.25 large 0.4 Complex 0.3125 mature 0.5
Not competitive 0.75 small 0.6 not comp 0.6875 not matr 0.5
LB TC 0.02 DOT TC 0.0245 WB TC 0.0266
other 0.98 other 0.9755 Other 0.9734
P TC 0.04401 COM TC 0.050448





Project Valueb(M) Procurement time (m) Experience level
Total TC
Project Value (scale) Procurement time 
Project Bid Price
Num of Bidders (Competition)
failed Bidder TC
PPP Maturity (location)
DOT TC Winning Bidder




thinks this is because the financial market turned.  However, within the industry it is 
believed that they did not know what they were doing on certain fronts and missed 
key opportunities to advance the project and make it feasible. So, it is not clear 
whether MoDOT's procurement costs can be viewed as representativ  or just another 
cost.  Mr. Mike Parker, the financial advisor for the  I-595 Project, calls this the 
“penny-wise / pound foolish” issue. 
 
Similarly, sometimes agencies draft loose contracts or negotiate sole source 
arrangements; the procurement cost may be lower (at least on the public side) but the 
long-term result is more costly to the public. Also, at times the public agency can 
spend money to facilitate better proposals; for example, undertaking baseline surveys. 
This might appear to increase public sector costs, yet is reducing the private sector 
bid costs and potentially the overall cost of the project. In a sole urce pre-
development arrangement, the private side may spend a lot to advance the project but 
can sometimes be offered reimbursement for costs if the project does not reach 
closure.  
 
5.5 Future research development 
The development of this model is solely based on the data available from PPP 
projects in EU countries. It is highly suggested that scholars study the effect of each 
variable on different categories of transaction cost based on data from infrastructure 
PPP projects in the US. Upon receipt of such data from PPP projects in the US, the 






Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
6.1 Final Conclusion 
As the current chapter has sought to explain, the dissertation shall focus upon 
assessing the transaction cost of PPPs . The main argument behid the need for 
estimating transaction costs is the fact that it will help all entities of the PPP to have a 
better understanding of the financial status of the project and prevent future losses. 
Meanwhile, public agencies can get reimbursed for the transaction osts that they 
incur while entering a PPP agreement by billing those costs t the project, and private 
companies can enjoy using higher amount of TIFIA credit from the federal 
government since transaction cost is considered as an eligible cost in alculation of a 
TIFIA loan.   
 
This thesis provides a platform for modeling transaction costs in infrastructure PPPs. 
It has developed a PPP process flowchart for infrastructure proj cts, and suggests a 
CBS, and a cost accounting system that can be used to better track and record 
transaction costs. It also compares two practices of transaction costs in two different 
projects as case studies to justify the cost accounting model and its benefits for the 
project. This thesis also suggests a cost estimation template to estimat  the transaction 
cost of projects as a percentage of total capital cost of the proj ct. This template has 
been developed based on the data collected from infrastructure PPP projects in 
Europe, and has been designed using Bayesian theory in order to account for the 
number of bidders (bidding competition level), capital cost of the project, lo ation 
(PPP program maturity level), and project complexity (uncertainty).  
 
 
Despite the referenced shortcomings or limitations, the fact remains that the study 
satisfied its outlined objectives and validated its hypotheses. The position adopted by 
the study was that there is a need for a good data accounting system in the US to track 
and record transaction costs, and such a system does not exist in many states.  The 





The literature also suggested that the transaction cost of PPPs is high, and there is a 
need to assess this cost to make sure that an increase in transaction costs does not 
demolish the cost benefits of PPPs. That statement was ultimatey studied through 
discussion of the factors affecting transaction costs of PPPs, and future estimates by a 
Bayesian Model based on data from European projects. 
 
The conclusion reached, therefore, is that while PPPs can be implmented in public 
sector projects to fill the financing gap between available resources and demands, it is 
very important to measure the costs of such partnerships to make sure the benefit to 
cost ratio is higher than one. Successful implementation of PPPs is not guaranteed 
and can only occur if the costs and revenues are evaluated realistically. One of the 
most important costs which plays a great role in the success or failure of PPPs is the 
transaction cost of PPPs which was discussed in-depth in this thesis.  
6.2 Contribution of Research 
Chapter 2 of the study were devoted to an in-depth review of Public Private 
Partnerships and transaction cost economics literature with a specific focus upon 
assessing transaction cost in PPPs.  Apart from framing the res arch’s focus, 
providing readers with an overview of, and background to public private partnership 
concepts and transaction cost theory, the literature review chapters functioned to 
direct the research towards an in-depth exploration of comparatively unexplored 
issues within transaction cost measurement in PPPs. This brings us directly to the 
question of the research’s contribution to the field. The research has made three 
contributions to the field of PPPs, each of which shall now be briefly highlighted. 
 
The first contribution lies in the discovery of the need for a good accounting system 
to track and record transaction costs incurred by different entities n a PPP 
infrastructure project. The literature review, data collection limitations, and 
comparison of case studies show the need for such a system in order to enhance the 





The second contribution of this research lies in the development of a cost ccounting 
matrix based on the work breakdown structure and general PPP process fl wchart. 
This system can be used as a basis for accounting systems to have a standard 
mechanism to assess transaction costs in PPPs.  
 
The last contribution of this study is the development of a Bayesian Network to 
estimate transaction costs of PPPs based on some variables suggeted by the literature 
such as number of bidders (bidding competition level), capital cost of the project, 
location (PPP program maturity level), and project complexity (uncertainty). This 
network is built based on data from some European countries, and keeps th  doors 
open for future research to enhance the accuracy by collecting data from US 
infrastructure PPP projects. 
 
6.3 Implications of the Study 
The field study led to the production of conceptual models which make an important 
contribution to assessing the transaction cost of PPPs in the US. Theory, as it 
currently stands, largely tends towards the qualitative aspects of transaction costs in 
PPPs; however, this research prepares a foundation for quantitative studies of 
transaction costs in PPPs in the US.   
 
The findings of this research can be used by both the private and publicsectors 
interested in PPPs. As the literature review suggests, some states uch as Virginia 
have passed legislation to allow state DOTs to bill the transaction costs incurred by 
the state DOT while procuring a PPP project to the total cost of the project and get 
reimbursed for such costs. On the other hand, transaction cost is one ofthe items 
which is eligible to be included in the cost of project while applying for a TIFIA loan. 
Therefore, there is a need for a systematic way to estimate it and include it in the cost 
estimation of the project in order to maximize the opportunity of using TIFIA in the 




6.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Work 
Even as the importance of the study was emphasized in the introductory chapter, it is 
necessary to conclude with a concession to the study’s limitations. Such a concession, 
will apart from framing the study in the sense that it outlines the basis upon which it 
should be judged, support the previously stated recommendations for future research. 
It is very possible that the present study be judged on the basis of that which it has no
covered. Accordingly, one need acknowledge that the study has not suggested a 
formula to estimate the transaction cost, but it has used Bayesian Theory to develop a 
network to estimate such costs. The main reason lies in the fact that PPP programs in 
the US are not well established yet, and therefore collecting accurate data especially 
about transaction costs of PPPs in the US is almost impossible 
 
. Lack of enough data makes it almost impossible to do any regression or statistical 
analysis on the current data.  Therefore, because of the mentioned l mitations the only 
available choice was to use a case-based methodology to justify the accounting 
model, and a Bayesian Network to develop a cost estimate model. Uncertai ty in the 
data collected in this research is high, and Bayesian Models are powerful in terms of 
accounting for it.  Therefore, a Bayesian Network is used for a transaction cost 
estimate model. However, this model should be further justified by collecting more 





Appendix 1:  Current PPP legislation status in the US 
 
State  Statute 
AK ALASKA STAT. §§ 19.75.111, .113, .211, .221, .330, .332, .334, .336, .338, .340, .241, 
.915, .920, .980 1 
 
CA CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 143, 149 to 149.6, 149.7 2 
CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 5956 to 5956.10 3 
CO COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1-1201 to 43-1-1209; 43-4-801 to 43-4-812; 43-3-201 to 43-3-4164 
  
HB 08-1354 5 
 
DE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 2001 to 2012 (2008) 6 
FL FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 334.30, 338.22 to 338.251 (2007) 7 
Amended by HB985 (2007)8 
GA GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 32-2-78 to 32-2-80 9 


















MD MD. CODE REGS. 11.07.06 10 
MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 8-204 11 
MN M INN. STAT. §§ 160.84 to 160.93 (2007) 12 
 
MS S.B. 2375, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2007).  
13 
NC N.C. GEN. STATE. §§ 136-89.180 to 136-89.198 14 
OR OR. REV. STAT. §§ 367.800 to 367.826. 15  
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 383.001 to 383.019 16 
PR P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2001 to 2021  
TX TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 223.001 to 223.209; 227.001 to 227.083; 228.001 to 228.254; 
370.001 to 370.365 17
VA VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-556 to 56-575 18
WA WASH. REV. CODE §§ 47.29.010 to 47.29.900; 47.46.010 to 47.46.900 19 
 
Appendix 2: 
Previous attempts to measure transaction cost in capital projects 
To examine the transaction cost breakdown structure in the work of other scholars, 
we have examined a few papers and have summarized the reviews in thi  section. 
These papers are referenced within the paper by the authors name ad year of 
publication. The following information explains how different scholars have applied 
transaction cost economics in different capital projects to create a transaction cost 
breakdown and quantify the transaction cost in capital projects. 
                                                
10 HTTP://WWW.DSD.STATE.MD.US/COMAR/SUBTITLE_CHAPTERS/11_CHAPTERS.HTML  
11 http://www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=mdcode 
12 http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/revisor/pages/statute/statute_chapter_toc.php?chapter=160 










Paper 1: Transaction Costs in PPP Transport Infrastructure Projects (Soliño & Santos, 
2009)  
1) Project preparation costs  
a) Preliminary studies, including Environmental Impact Assessment 
b) Feasibility study 
c) Preliminary design 
 
2) Bidding costs  
a) Tender documentation preparation 
b) Negotiation costs 
 
Note: This study tried to distinguish, at every stage, between external costs (such as 
technical, legal and financial advice) and in-house costs. 
 
Paper 2:  Assessing Transaction Costs of Project-based Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007) 
1) Search cost 
a) Identifying the project  
b) Selecting the project 
c) Selecting project partners  
d) Selecting project consultants 
 
Note: Search costs for a project are likely to depend on institutional 
constraints, firm experience, and search procedures. For the latter, the search 
process may include a single project or a set of projects, as in the case of a call 
for proposals that generates numerous applicants. In a call for proposals, 
search costs will be shared across projects, thus reducing the search cost per 
project. 
 
2) Feasibility Studies cost 
a)  GHG baseline assessment and the 
                                      Determination of the appropriateness of its  
                                      addition.  
b) Engineering 
c) Marketing 
d) Baseline and environmental assessments to  
                                     determine the overall viability of the project  





3) Negotiation  
a) Obtaining permits 
b) Arranging financing 
c) Negotiating emission-reduction purchase 
                                     contracts  
d) Marketing and contracting for GHG credits. 
 
4) Monitoring and Verification: 
a) Monitoring plan preparation prior to the  
                                     project start date, and continual monitoring  
                                     and verification of a project’s GHG savings  
b) Developing a protocol 
c) Regular monitoring/reporting of emission 
                                     reductions 
d) Third party verification of reductions.  
 
5) Regulatory approval  
a) The validation cost incurred ex-ante to  
                                     confirm that the project is eligible for claiming 
                                     reductions.  
b) Ex-post certification  . 
c) The registering and certification by a national 
                                      and/or international regulatory body. 
 
6) Insurance  
a) Insuring cost of the emission reductions.  
b) Self-insure by portfolio diversification cost 
c) Pooling projects 
 
Paper 3: Transaction Costs in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects (United 
Nation's Development Programme) 
1) Project design costs:  
a) Preparing project design document  
b) Submit it for approval.  
c) communicating with government 
d) consulting  costs 
 
2) Other CDM costs 
a) registration fees 
b) CDM Executive Board may impose additional costs on companies involved in the 




directly related to the project, but rather reflect costs associated with implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol. For instance: 
c) Adaptation: Two per cent of CDM project proceeds will be levied for use as an 
adaptation fund except in the case of the least develop developed countries. For all 
other projects, this levy is compulsory. 
 
3) Other potential costs 
a) Some host countries also require sharing of CERs(several countries levy this in the 
form  of a tax; Chile, for example) 
b)  Insurance services to ensure delivery of contracted CER, or the opportunity cost of 




Figure 17: Transaction Cost Estimate for CDM Projects (United Nation's Development Programme)
 
 
Paper 4: Aid Transaction Costs in Viet Nam (Noi, 2000) 
 
1. Project Identification and Appraisal 
a. Information requirements during identification vary between 
government and donors. Donors require much more information at 
this stage of the project cycle than government.29 Requirements vary 
across donors, but generally include data on general economic 
conditions in Vietnam, outlook for the relevant sector, socio-economic 
information etc., which would not be collected if a project was 




with a large grounds presence, gather the data themselves. However, 
many others ask the line Ministry to collect the information on their 
behalf. This means for example that MARD has to contact other 
departments, such as the Ministry of Finance, MPI, Social Welfare and 
others. This will often takes considerable time and causes delays in the 
pre appraisal process. 
b. Delays at this stage are exacerbated by the incentives that MARD 
has to priorities projects which are already in the preparation 
stage, where donor funding has already been secured. These take 
priority over those only in pre-appraisal, thus causing further delays. 
c. Limited Vietnamese input during preparation and project design. 
This is due to the tight resource constraints under which government 
departments are expected to operate at this stage of the project cycle. 
No additional GoV budget allocations for projects are approved until 
after appraisal, so departments and other agencies must fund project 
preparation from their limited recurrent budget allocations, which is 
difficult where field visits or specialist consultancy services are 
required. 
d. Imbalance between national and international participation. 
Donors rely heavily on international consultants. The national input in 
the preparation phase, from national consultants and MARD, is very 
small. In practice this has had two consequences. Firstly, projects are 
prepared according to donor procedures. This causes transaction costs 
for government, as its own procedures differ from those of donors. It 
also raises accountability issues, as the international consultants tend 
to be accountable to the donor only. 
e. Reduced government ownership and sustainability. In almost all 
projects there is a clear distinction between staff who prepare a project 
and staff who implement it. As a rule, PMUs are only set up after the 
preparing and negotiating the project. PMU staff are, therefore, not 
involved in preparation. This leads to two types of problems and costs: 
PMU staff do not know as much about the background and content of 
the project than if they had been involved from the start; and more 
importantly ownership of and commitment to the project is lower. This 
was the general perception of government and donor staff interviewed. 
f. Centralized government structures. Centralized decision making is 
also a big constraint on the government side, and a protracted appraisal 





i. A multi-stage review process, particularly for large projects, 
requiring appraisals for inclusion in the plan, as preliminary 
proposals and subsequently following detailed feasibility 
studies; 
ii.  A multi-level appraisal process, involving line agencies and 
provincial governments, MPI and, for large projects, the 
National Project Evaluation Committee; 
iii.  Multi-agency consultations during project design and appraisal, 
sometimes further hampered by poor communication between 
agencies. 
g. Donor understanding of intra-Governmental relationships is often 
scant. Many donors are unclear about how they should relate to 
different government institutions at different stages in the process 
leading to project approval. This is partly because Government 
decision-making requires multiple levels of approval, and the division 
of roles and powers between the line Ministry, MPI, the Office of the 
Government and Provincial authorities regarding project approval are 
not well understood. 
h. Technical appraisal by government may be cursory. Grant financed 
projects, particularly those for technical assistance, are subject to only 
cursory appraisal. This is partly due to the limited appraisal capacity 
within government, particularly at provincial level, but also because 
agencies regard such resources as “free”. Besides, in the absence of a 
clearly defined strategy and appraisal criteria, there may be no clearly 
articulated basis for rejecting a proposal36 resulting in technically 
weak or inappropriate projects receiving approval and result in 
problems and transaction costs during subsequent project 
implementation. 
2. Negotiation and Approval of Financing Agreements 
a. Centralization of approval of financing agreements and 
requirements for wide consultation may be a source of delay in 
project start-up. 
b. Where negotiations run into problems these are often related to 
shortcomings during project preparation, e.g. not taking into 
account local conditions sufficiently. Revisions during negotiations 
can substantially raise transaction costs and lead to long delays, 
especially if revisions mean revisiting or duplicating preparation work. 
c. The financing structure of the project. Main areas of negotiation 
include the balance between government and donor financing, and 




more focused on capital expenditure, and on several occasions has 
asked donors to reduce recurrent expenditures (consumables), and 
instead put them ‘into the project’ (capital expenditure). 
d. Problems with information exchange during the negotiation phase. 
3. Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation 
a. Costs arising from the need to follow multiple procedures. 
Transaction costs arise from the duplication involved in having 
parallel (Government and donor) procedures. 
b. Government procurement authority is over-centralised, and long 
delays occur as requests, information and approvals travel up and 
down the government hierarchy. 
c. Financial management and reporting. PMUs prepare annual and 
quarterly reports on project implementation, the receipt and use of 
capital by source of funds, and an assessment of implementation 
results are sent through the parent agency to MPI, MOF and the Offic
of Government. However, even within Government’s own systems 
there is an element of duplication. 
d. Delays in receipt of government funds have been another source of 
transaction costs. 
e. The use of PMUs – and indirect costs. Responsibility for project 
implementation is usually delegated to PMUs, headed by a Project 
Director and staffed by both permanent line-agency and contracted 
personnel. PMUs vary considerably in size, some having only five 




Appendix 3: PPP projects flow diagram examples 
 















Appendix 4:Transaction Cost Data Collection Sheets 
1. Version 1 
        
     Low Medium High 
How expensive is the total estimated budget for the 
project? 1     
What is the uncertanity/complexity of the project?   1   
What is the location/frequency of the project? 1     
        
What is the total cost of project?      
        
In-House costs   External Costs   
        
Office expenses and supplies   Waiting time    
Permits   Permits    
Proposal evaluation   Legislator    
Estimation expenses   Political costs    
Accounting services   Opportunity cost    
Legal services   R & D    
Advertising expenses   Administration cost    
Public relations       
office assistance (payroll)       
traveling and shipments       
Insurance       
Audit fees       







2. Transaction Cost Data Sheet (Version 2) 




     Low Medium High 
What is the number of the bidders? 1     
What is the uncertanity/complexity of the project?   1   
What is the PPP maturity of different entities of the project? 1     
        
        
What is the total cost of project?      
What is the duration of the project?      
        
In-House costs       






Cost 1)      Search cost  
a)      Identifying the project         
b)      Prescreening the project         
c)       selecting project team         
d)      Selecting project consultants         
           
2)      Feasibility Studies cost         
a)      Engineering and technical         
b)       Market          
c)      environmental studies         
e)      Public opinion/ legislature/ political         
           
3)      Negotiation:         
a)      the costs of obtaining necessary permits and 
approvals         
b)      preparing bidding documents         
c)       negotiating contract / Bidding          
d)      marketing and advertising         
   Total Direct  In-House TC   
   OH ( net multiplier 3)   
   Total In-House TC   
Notes        
OH will be assumed to be 160% which is the industry average in construction projects in private 
companies. 
A multiplier of 1.15 will be used in order to account for the inefficiency of the public agency compare to 
private companies. 
For simplicity purposes, the political cost, opportunity cost and communication costs are not being 
considered. 
        
External Costs       
        




 Legal  Consultant      
 Financial Consultant      
        
        
    Total TC (In-house+ External)   
 
External Costs       
        
 Technical consultant      
 Legal  Consultant      
 Financial Consultant      
        
        
    Total TC (In-house+ External)   
 
 
3. Transaction Cost Data Sheet ( Version 3) 
 
            
          
       Total Cost   How important is this cost? 
       $ (K)   N/A Low Average High 
-LEGAL CONSULTANT FEES:             
-AUDIT FEES:             
-ARCHITECTURAL/ENGIEERING CONSULTIG              
-PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANT:             
-ACCOUNTING CONSULTANT:             
-FINANCIAL/BUSIESS CONSULTANT:             
-ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANT               
-OTHER (PLEASE 
SPECIFY):               
           
 No.   RATE/        
     Day    How important is this cost? 
          N/A Low Average High 
0 X 0.0  = 0          
0 X 0.0  = 0          
0 X 0.0  = 0          
0 X 0.0  = 0          
0 X 0.0  = 0          




 0 X 0.0  = 0          
            
   TOTAL =   0      
           
ENGINEERING          
  -            
  No.   RATE/        
      Day    How important is this cost? 
           N/A Low Average High 
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
 0 X 0.0  = 0          
     = 0          
   TOTAL =        
           
             
SALARIED STAFF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS      
  - ------------------------------------      
             How important is this cost? 
             N/A Low Average High 
       0.0            
       0.0            
       0.0            
       0           
           
      
SUM OF Staff 
Salaries =        
      PERCENT =        
           
 TOTAL  =           
            
           
           
           
TRAVEL TIME PAY             = 0  How important is this cost? 
  - ------------------ = 0  N/A Low Average High 




             
     0      
: 0 X 0.0         
: 0 X 0.0         
: 0 X 0.0         
           
   TOTAL =          
 
OFFICE EQUIPMENT AND 
SUPPLIES        
 - ---------------------------------        
          How important is this cost? 
     COST($)   N/A Low Average High 
-OFFICE RENT:                  
-EQUIPMENT(CARS/COMPUTERS 
/FURNITURE):  0.0            
-PAYROLL & ACC. SOFTWARE & HARDWARE:  0.0            
-SURVEYING EQUP. 
& SUPPLIES :     0.0            
-REPRODUCTION 
EQUP. & SUPPL.:                 
-DRAFTING EQUP. & 
SUPPLIES  :     0.0            
-CONSULTING, 
TESTING & INSP.:     0.0            
-
OTHERS
:       0.0            
  TOTAL =           
   How important is this cost? 
     COST($)   N/A Low Average High 
INSURANCE PREMIUMS               
NON-INSURED 
CLAIMS                
OTHER                  
           
           
 TOTAL =           
-------------------------          
       How important is this cost? 
     COST($)   N/A Low Average High 
-LONG DISTANCE CALLS & MAIL EXPENSES              
-
OTHERS
:                    
           
           




     COST($)      
           
       How important is this cost? 
  BONUS OR PENALTY               COST($)   N/A Low Average High 
  - -------------------              
  PERMITS                  
  - -------------------        
  PARENT DEPARTMENT COSTS              
  - -------------------        
  TOTAL DIRECT (PAYROLLS)             COST($)      
  - -------------------         
  TOTAL INDIRECT         
  - -------------------        
  ESCALATION                          
































Appendix 4: Project information data for PPP infrastructure proj ects in 
the US 
 





Lanes SH 130 (seg 5 & 6) 
North Tarrant 
Express 
Delivery/Contract Method DBFOM DBFOM DBFOM 
Construction Duration 5 years 5   
Operation Duration 52 years 50 52 years 
Fiscal Year approved 2009 2007 2009 
Funding sources       
State and federal       
Concessionaire's financing        
GARVEE       
GO bond       
TIFIA Loan $800  $430  $650  
Private activity $400    $398  
Senior Banking Debt   $685.80    
Senior term Facility 
Debt $400      
State infrastructure 
bank loan       
Section 129 loan       
Other:       
        
Equity       
Private $598.50  $209.80  $426  
State $445    $573  
Revenue (toll or interest) $34.50  $2.30    
Check total $2,678  $1,328  #REF! 
Total according to documents $2,678  $1,327.90  $2,047  














Project Name I-495 Hot Lanes I-95/395 Hot Lanes U.S. Route 460 
Delivery/Contract Method DBFOM     
Construction Duration 5 years     
Operation Duration 80 years     
Fiscal Year approved 2008 2006 2010 
Funding sources     
State and federal       
Concessionaire's 
financing        
GARVEE       
GO bond       
TIFIA Loan $589  157.3   
Private activity $589      
Senior Banking 
Debt   859   
Senior term 
Facility Debt       
State infrastructure 
bank loan       
Section 129 loan       
Other: State of Virginia Grant                               
  $409      
Equity       
Private 350.00 270.00   
State       
Revenue (toll or interest)   55.3   
Check total $1,937  $1,342  $0  
Total according to 
documents 1938.00 1341.60   













Project Name I-595 
Delivery/Contract Method DBFOM 
Construction Duration 5 years 
Operation Duration 35 years 
Fiscal Year approved 2008 
Funding sources   
State and federal   
Concessionaire's financing    
GARVEE   
GO bond   
TIFIA Loan $603  
Private activity   
Senior Banking Debt $781.10  
Senior term Facility Debt   
State infrastructure bank 
loan   
Section 129 loan   
Other: FDOT qualifying dvlpm funds 
  $232  
Equity   
Private $207.70  
State   
Revenue (toll or interest) $10  
Check total $1,834  
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